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THE NEED FOR REFORM OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
MASS TORT LITIGATION: JUZWIN v. AMTORG
TRADING CORP.
INTRODUCTION
Legal theories must grow and adapt to the social and economic realities
of the times. Developments in the scope of commercial trade coupled with
innovations in the field of tort litigation' have created a strain on the judicial
process in many areas, including the mass tort context. The use of punitive
damages in mass tort actions have caused several problems that the present
legal system may be unable to resolve. These difficulties have prompted one
commentator to announce:
[P]unitive damages are out of control.... [T]he explosion in punitive
judgments has not been accompanied by a reform of the terms of their
imposition .... Nowhere is the danger more complete than in products
liability and other mass tort cases, where punitive damages may be repet-
itively invoked against a single course of conduct in unfair and potentially
ruinous aggregation.2
Problems inherent in the nature of mass tort litigation raise doubts re-
garding the propriety of punitive damages in such suits.' Yet, it seems
anomalous that by extending the scope of their tortious conduct, defendants
should find a means of escaping liability for punitive damages. 4 Concerns
1. For an insightful discussion of the modern tort reform movement, see Priest, Modern
Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 1 (1987). Professor Priest attributes the current
flux in the field of tort liability to judicial action in the early 1960's which broadened the scope
of liability, particularly for corporations and other business enterprises. Id. at 1-2. These
developments, in turn, helped trigger a concern over the size and overall costs of damages
awards. The difficulties associated with this increase are no longer simply confronted by the
relatively small community of business executives who were initially effected by this expansion
of liability. The public at large has been forced to deal with the ramifications of these
developments in the form of the "insurance crisis" of the 1980s. Id.
2. Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV.
139 (1986).
3. See Szuch & Shelley, Mass Cases Prompt Need for Reassessment: Time to Eliminate
Punitive Damages?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 1983, at 13, col. 1 (suggesting that punitive damages
may not accomplish the goal of deterrence and further, the intended punishment does not effect
one responsible party, but rather a number of relatively innocent parties, stockholders).
4. See Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Il1. App. 3d 654, 658, 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (1st Dist.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 98 Il1. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983). The court stated:
[W]e do not believe that defendants should be relieved of liability for punitive
damages because, through outrageous misconduct, they have managed to seriously
injure a large number of persons. Such a rule would encourage wrongdoers to
continue their misconduct because, if they kept it up long enough to injure a large
number of people, they could escape liability for all punitive damages.
107 Il1. App. 3d at 658, 437 N.E.2d at 913 (Emphasis in original).
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regarding the size of damages awards, particularly punitive damages, and
their impact on defendants have prompted various state legislatures to es-
tablish limits for these remedies in an effort to curb their impact.' With
respect to mass tort litigation, however, a number of issues peculiar to the
complexities of these claims, render the procedural methods of traditional
tort litigation ineffective in protecting the interests of a fair trial for all
parties involved.
A recent opinion 6 from the District Court for the Northern District of
New Jersey highlighted the difficulties courts face when attempting to address
the fundamental problems and concerns which have developed in the context
of punitive damages in mass tort litigation. 7 In Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading
Corp., the district court originally granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
all claims for punitive damages in an asbestos-related products liability
action.' The court based this decision on the belief that such damages violated
the defendants' right to due process guaranteed under the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 9 The court, however, later reversed
its denial of the punitive damages claims. On rehearing, the court maintained
its assertion that multiple awards of punitive damages based on a single
course of conduct are unconstitutional. Yet, owing to limitations within the
procedural methods for assessing and awarding such exemplary damages,
the court felt compelled to vacate the order barring the punitive claims.' 0
This Juzwin court's most recent opinion pointedly focuses the difficulties
which have been at the center of an ongoing debate regarding the propriety
of punitive damages in mass tort litigation. This Note will examine a number
of the issues at the heart of this dialectic. By first examining the traditions
5. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987) (limiting punitive damages to no more than
the amount given in compensatory damages but giving the court discretion to make an addition
of up to three times the actual damages in certain cases); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West
Supp. 1989) (limiting punitive damage awards to no more than three times the compensatory
sum awarded); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001-.008 (Vernon Supp. 1990)
(limiting punitive damages to four times the actual damages or $200,000, whichever is greater
for cases involving fraud or gross negligence but not for cases involving malice or intentional
torts). Such reforms have been challenged on various grounds. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Nov. 3,
1989, at B2, col. 3 (Alabama law limiting punitive damages to a maximum of $250,000 subject
to state constitutional challenge). For a discussion of damage caps, see generally Ghiardi,
Punitive Damages-Legislative Reform, 39 FED'N INS. AND CORP. COuNS. Q. 189, 195-97 (1989)
(listing state statutes that limit the dollar amount of punitive awards and statutes that require
part of punitive awards be paid to a public or state entity).
6. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989).
7. Punitive damages are also referred to variously as "vindictive," "exemplary," "puni-
tory," "speculative," "imaginary," "presumptive," and "added" damages or, on a few
occasions, even as "smart money." This Note will use "punitive" or "exemplary" damages in
referring to such awards.
8. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1065 (D.N.J.), vacated on hearing,
718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989).
9. Id.
10. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (D.N.J. 1989).
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and problems inherent in the development of punitive damages awards, the
Note will establish a background highlighting some of the concerns encoun-
tered when imposing these sanctions. Next, the Note will focus on the current
phenomenon of mass tort litigation and examine the peculiar difficulties
encountered in attempting to satisfy the policies embodied in the due process
doctrine. After examining the reasoning of the Juzwin court, the Note will
examine potential federal legislation intended to alleviate some of the prob-
lems identified herein.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Punitive Damages: Definition and Rationales
Punitive damages constitute an exception to the general rule that damages
awards are designed to compensate the victim." There are two primary
rationales for granting punitive damages: first, to punish the defendant for
reprehensible conduct; and second, to deter the defendant and others from
engaging in such conduct in the future. 2 Critics of the concept of punitive
damages have argued that the civil law should not be concerned with
punishing parties but should be limited to reparation for actual injuries.'3
11. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981).
12. Id. at 266-67; W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. "Punitive damages are
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish
him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in
the future." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). Thus, by definition, punitive
damages are not concerned with the extent of harm suffered by the plaintiff as a measurement
of the award. Rather, they are based on the aggravated misconduct or the egregious mental
state of the defendant. E.g., Pacemaker Food Stores, Inc. v. Seventh Mont Corp., 143 Il1.
App. 3d 781, 789, 493 N.E.2d 390, 391 (2d Dist. 1986) (allegations that defendants "acted with
a conscious disregard and indifference to the rights of the plaintiff" did not set forth conduct
which would justify the imposition of punitive damages); Williams v. Steves Indus., 699 S.W.2d
570, 572 (Tex. 1985) (punitive damages may be awarded only upon a showing of gross
negligence). See also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204-205 (1973)
(the court must determine if there is sufficient proof of aggravated misconduct to warrant
punitive damages).
In most jurisdictions, punitive damages awards are based on conduct that is willful, wanton,
or in conscious disregard of the consequences. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES § 79, at 280-82 (1935). In First Nat'l Bank of Des Plaines v. Amco Engineering Co.,
32 11. App. 3d 451, 455, 335 N.E.2d 591, 594 (2d Dist. 1975), the court stated that punitive
damages "are assessed in the interest of society to punish the defendant and to warn him and
others that his acts are offensive to society. Where a wrongful act is accompanied by aggravating
circumstances such as wilful, wanton, malicious or oppressive conduct, punitive damages should
be allowed." Cf. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. at 267 (punitive damages
cannot be assessed against a municipality because it is not capable of misconduct).
13. Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 124, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (1975) (recovery in civil
cases is limited to compensation for the injury sustained) (citations omitted); see also Fay v.
Parker 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872) (punishment is confined to criminal law and should not be
used as a civil remedy); Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 614, 621, 565 P.2d 94, 98 (1977) (no
statutory provision allowing punitive damages).
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Punishment, it is claimed, should be left to the functions of the criminal
courts which provide procedural safeguards not present in civil proceedings.14
Proponents of exemplary damages respond that such criticism is the product
of an unnecessarily narrow conception of the function and purpose of civil
law."5
Courts and commentators have advanced various justifications for punitive
damages, including the belief that exemplary damages are, in part, compen-
satory "in the limited sense that they may provide damages for the wounded
feelings of the plaintiff.' ' 6 The belief that punitive damages are needed in
order to compensate the plaintiff for intangible harm such as pain and
14. See, e.g., Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statement in the Affir-
mative, 1965 A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS, SECTION OF INS. NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW, 282,
287-88. Professor Ghiardi argues that exemplary damages, which are by definition intended to
punish are thus akin to criminal sanctions. He maintains that the imposition of such sanctions
absent the procedural safeguards afforded the criminal defendant is "uncivilized." The criminal
courts are better equipped to effectuate the vindication of social interests because they are
endowed with "flexibility in sentencing .... vast experience with wrongdoers, and . . .[a] staff
of parole, probation and other experts." Id. at 287. Furthermore, before punishment is imposed,
a civil defendant should be afforded the constitutional guarantees protecting a criminal defendant
including: an elevated burden of proof, freedom from self-incrimination, right to counsel, and
freedom from double jeopardy when he has previously been punished for his conduct. Id.
Professor Ghiardi contends the experience and expertise of the criminal courts in dealing with
matters of punishment is preferred to the unguided "whimsy" and "irrational prejudices"
which often mark the decisions of juries in matters regarding punitive damages. Id. If the
defendant's actions do not amount to a crime, he should not be punished. Id. at 288.
Compensatory damages are themselves sufficient to protect the plaintiff's interests and, should
additional measures be needed in order to effectuate deterrence, plaintiffs may seek alternate
relief, including equitable remedies. Id. See also Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled
Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 885 (1976) (the absence of procedural safeguards in civil
litigation leave the punitive damages defendant extremely vulnerable).
15. See, e.g., Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931).
According to Professor Morris, civil law properly serves two functions: reparative and admon-
itory. The primary goal of tort law is to provide compensation for injured plaintiffs; that is,
to achieve reparative ends. Id. While the desire to compensate an injured party provides a
rationale for giving the plaintiff a monetary award, it does not alone support the practice of
taking those damages from the defendant. Id. Therefore, in a large proportion of tort cases, a
degree of culpability on the part of the defendant must be established in order for the plaintiff
to recover. Id. at 1174. The finding of a requisite degree of fault (or other grounds for liability
such as strict liability) justifies taking damages from the defendant and, Morris argues, the
requirement "might discourage a repetition of his wrongful conduct and serve as a warning to
others who are inclined to commit similar wrongs." Id. The tort laws governing liability
therefore have been established in order to protect the economic interests of the injured plaintiff
as well as promoting the interests of society by "discouraging conduct which is likely to prove
injurious and is not worth the risk it entails." Id. at 1174-75. See also United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (civil proceedings may
include punitive awards); Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 647-48 (1980) (civil law is shaped in order to enforce rules of behavior
and punitive damages are often the only deterrent available, particularly when the conduct has
not violated any criminal provisions).
16. D. DOBBS, supra note 12, § 3.9, at 205 (citing Loeblich v. Gamier, 113 So. 2d 95 (La.
App. 1959)).
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suffering and emotional distress was indeed a factor in the historical devel-
opment of exemplary awards" and a few courts have recognized a compen-
satory element in punitive damages.'" Although punitive damages may no
longer be necessary as a compensatory tool with respect to intangible losses
that are now recoverable in modern courts,' 9 exemplary awards may yet
provide a secondary means of compensation by effectively sidestepping the
American rule which requires each party to pay her own costs of litigation.
Attorney's fees and other litigation expenses are not included as part of a
compensatory award, prompting some observers to contend punitive damages
provide a fund out of which these expenses may be paid.
20
Another theory supporting punitive damages is that the availability of
such added sanctions will provide an incentive for the plaintiff to bring suit
where such action is desirable because of the egregious nature of the defen-
dant's conduct. 2' In cases where compensatory damages alone are likely to
17. At common law, courts refused damages for nonpecuniary injuries such as insult, hurt
feelings and mental suffering. A desire to compensate for such injuries encouraged courts to
apply punitive damages in cases where the defendant's conduct was particularly egregious. 1
L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(C) (2d ed. 1989).
18. E.g., Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 578, 150 A. 692, 693 (1930) (the purpose of
punitive damages is not punishment, but compensation of the plaintiff for his injuries; therefore,
punitive damages cannot exceed the amount of the plaintiff's expenses of litigation, minus
taxable costs); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 233, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (1922) (punitive damages
enlarge the compensatory allowance but are not considered a separate sum to punish or make
an example of the defendant); Fay v. Parker 53 N.H. 342, 355 (1873) ("one hundred twenty
years ago the term smart money was employed in a manner entirely different from the modern
signification which it has obtained, being then used as indicating compensation for the smarts
of the injured person, and not, as now, money required by way of punishment, and to make
the wrongdoer smart") (emphasis in original). But see Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F.
Supp. 1273, 1283 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (punitive damages historically have not been considered to
have a compensatory function).
19. Current damages procedures routinely provide a means for the plaintiff to recover
intangible losses through awards for injuries such as pain and suffering, mental anguish and
humiliation. E.g., Ard v. Samedan Oil Corp., 475 So. 2d 384, 386 (La. App. 1985) (it is within
the court's discretion to award damages for mental anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment),
aff'd in part, 483 So. 2d 925 (La. 1986). Commentators suggest it seems unnecessary to provide
additional damages in order to compensate for losses which are already directly addressed
through formulas that account for that injury. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at
276. The author points out that exemplary damages are not justified on the basis of inadequacy
of actual damages, which may include compensation not only for physical injury and monetary
loss, but for "pain, mental suffering, humiliation, indignity, and loss of reputation" as well.
Id.
20. See, e.g., Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 6 n.21 (1985) (providing citations for authorities
addressing viability of awarding punitive damages in an attempt to defray litigation expenses);
see also D. DOBBS, supra note 12, at 221 (suggesting that some of the impetus for punitive
damages would diminish if there was an effective scheme for financing reasonable litigation).
21. D. DOBBS, supra note 12, at 205. See Marvex Processing & Finishing Corp. v. Allendale
Mut. Ins. Co., 91 Misc. 2d 683, 684, 398 N.Y.S.2d 464, 466 (1977) (courts will uphold punitive
damage where the defendant's conduct involved a high degree of moral culpability and consti-
tuted a fraud on the public).
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be modest, the prospect of receiving punitive damages may encourage indi-
viduals to uphold legal norms by bringing suit, thus acting as "private
attorney generals." 22 In light of the social benefits realized through civil
proceedings and their admonitory functions, providing incentives to pursue
these goals is important, particularly where the promise of compensatory
recovery is insufficient to stir the plaintiff to action and no criminal provi-
sions address the conduct in question.23
Various additional theories have influenced the development of punitive
damages and provide at least peripheral support to the doctrine. A desire to
redress unequal punishment at criminal law has been asserted as an impetus
behind the development of punitive damages. 24 A disparity between the
penalties available for minor offenses to property, as compared to minor
offenses to the person, which could be obtained in criminal law in theory,
prompted courts to allow punitive damages in civil cases. This reflected an
attempt by the judiciary to achieve a greater balance between the remedies
available for property and personal injuries. Though reasonable, this argu-
ment has provided only theoretical support for the punitive damages doc-
trine.25
Punitive damages are also alleged to satisfy a need for revenge and provide
a forum for expressing public outrage.2 6 By providing the plaintiff a means
to extract some revenge, the punitive damages award offers the aggrieved
party a viable alternative to indulging in some form of unlawful retribution.
The prospect of receiving an exemplary award encourages the party to bring
her claim before a court for resolution according to accepted rules of law. 27
This dissuasion of unlawful activity has prompted a number of courts to
22. See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 403, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488,
490 (1961) (a punitive action against the defendant serves the public interest and encourages
the plaintiff to bring civil and criminal prosecution). Punitive damages enforce the law by
encouraging private individuals to uphold legal norms. Specifically, such damages help offset
the expense of prosecuting worthy claims which entail only modest compensatory damages. See
Ausness, supra note 20, at 5. Exemplary damages also serve to bring to justice a tortfeasor
whose conduct is particularly offensive. Because the plaintiff may recover an amount in excess
of actual damages, he is encouraged to bring such an action. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 15,
at 649-50.
23. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 15, at 649-50. See also Simmons v. Atlas Vac Mach. Co.,
475 F. Supp. 1181, 1182 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (punitive damages serve to punish a wrongdoer in
situations in which there is no public prosecution); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins.
Co. 84 Wis. 2d 91, 100, 267 N.W.2d 595, 599 (1978) (same proposition).
24. 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at § 1.3(F).
25. Id. (pointing out that there is no explicit case support for this position).
26. Syester v. Banta, 257 Iowa 613, 621, 133 N.W.2d 666, 675 (1965) (exemplary damages
provide a means of retaliation against the defendant for his antisocial conduct); I L. SCHLUETER
&. K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at § 1.3(G).
27. This subrogation of the individual impulse to social desires provides a general.base for
the authority of courts of law. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 2-4 (1923) (presenting a
general view of the common law following a historical perspective as well as existing theories
of legislation).
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expressly condone the revengeful nature of punitive damages.28 Because juries
have usually assessed punitive damages,2 9 such awards also provided a fitting
forum for the expression of public outrage with respect to particularly
outrageous or egregious behavior on the part of the defendant. 0 While a
wide variety of considerations supported and influenced the development of
punitive damages awards, 3 the most widely accepted justification for punitive
damages remains the dual interests of punishment and deterrence.12
B. The Debate Regarding the Propriety of Punitive Damages
Legal systems providing for recovery of multiple damages surpassing the
amount needed for compensation can be traced back to ancient Rome.33
More recently, punitive damages have an extensive history in the English
common law and American jurisprudence.3 4 The acceptance of the doctrine
of punitive damages has been so widespread that only five jurisdictions
refuse to issue such awards" and of these, three allow exemplary damages
28. See, e.g., Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (1814) (large punitive damages awards
serve to discourage dueling).
29. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text (discussing procedures for awarding punitive
damages).
30. 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at § 1.3(G).
31. See id. at §§ 1.3, 2.2 (theories behind punitive damages include mental anguish and
other intangible harms, deterrence of wrongdoers, redress of inequities in the criminal forum
and satisfaction of revenge); D. DOBBS, supra note 12, at § 3.9 (punitive damages provide
incentive for a plaintiff to sue in a case where public interest requires action against the
defendant, yet without a punitive award, the plaintiff is insufficiently encouraged to sue).
32. 1 L. SCHLUETER &. K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at § 2.2(A). See also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (punitive damages are not compensation for injuries but
rather constitute private fines incurred to punish reprehensible conduct).
33. 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at § 1.2. Punitive awards have been
recognized for nearly 4000 years. Id.
34. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371 (1851) (the concept of punitive damages
is so well-established within the American legal system that the question of their propriety is
not subject to argument). English courts upheld awards of damages in excess of the amount
of physical harm suffered well before the eighteenth century. I L. SCHLUETER &. K. REDDEN,
supra note 17, at § 1.3(A). The first reported English case awarding punitive damages occurred
in 1763. Wilkes v. Wood, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 767 (1763). In America, one of the
earliest recorded awards of punitive damages appeared in 1791. Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.L.
90 (1791).
35. Ganapolsky v. Park Gardens Dev. Corp., 439 F.2d 844, 846 n.* (1st Cir. 1971) (applying
Puerto Rican law); Caperci v. Huntoon 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.) (applying Massachusetts
law), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Riard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882, 884 (La. 1980); Prather
v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 11, 26 N.W.2d 766, 772 (1978); Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp.,
27 Wash. App. 512, 521-22, 618 P.2d 1330, 1337 (1980), affd, 96 Wash. 2d 416, 635 P.2d 708
(1981).
While few jurisdictions have effected a total ban on punitive damages, a growing number
are restricting the availability of such awards in specific instances. For example, Illinois has
banned punitive damages in medical and legal malpractice actions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0,
para. 2-1115 (1987). Oregon similarly refuses such awards in medical malpractice cases provided
the physician is licensed and registered or certified. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.550 (Supp. 1987). A
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when expressly provided by statute.3 6 The case law concerning punitive
damages developed in the context of traditional one-on-one litigation,37
usually involving claims based on an intentional tort with punitive damages
assessed on the basis of the egregious conduct or mental state of the
defendant.3" As the development of tort law has traditionally been left to
state courts, the punitive damages doctrine has been defined and executed
at the state court level.39
In spite of the longstanding and extensive recognition of punitive damages,
a debate concerning the propriety of the awards has commanded the interest
of courts and commentators for more than one hundred yearsi 0 Attacks on
number of states have abolished punitive damages in product liability actions against drug
manufacturers if the drug was manufactured and labeled under F.D.A. approval or was
recognized as safe under F.D.A. regulations. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80
(Anderson 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (Supp. 1987).
36. Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 359 So. 2d 607, 610 (La. 1978); Boot Mills v. Boston
& M.R.R. 218 Mass. 582, 589, 106 N.E. 680, 683-84 (1914); Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods.,
73 Wash. 2d 23, 25, 436 P.2d 186, 187 (1968).
37. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 15, at 658-60 (discussing punitive damages in the
context of tort and contract actions).
38. Id. The traditional relegation of punitive damages as a remedy in tort actions is reflected
in the generally recognized prohibition against such awards in contract cases. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979). Exceptions to this restriction have developed. One
approach to allowing punitive damages in cases involving breach of contract was employed by
the California Supreme Court in Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). In Gruenberg, the court recognized an implied duty of good faith
in all insurance contracts and found that a breach of this obligation gave rise to an action in
tort as well as contract. Id. at 574, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Some courts,
however, have taken a more direct approach and assessed punitive damages in contract actions
involving malicious or oppressive conduct without implying the existence of a tort. See, e.g.,
Whitfield Constr. Co. v. Commercial Dev. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 982 (D.V.I. 1982) (punitive
damages awarded in an action by a contractor for money due on a contract and damages
resulting from breach of the contract); Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635
(Ind. App. 1976) (punitive damages awarded against manufacturer for defects in a mobile
home); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975) (punitive damages awarded where
defendant knowingly violated the terms of a restrictive covenant). The direct approach of
awarding exemplary damages in contract actions not involving tortious conduct has been
applauded on the grounds that the availability of these awards should not depend on techni-
calities such as which area of substantive law the pleadings relegate the case. Sullivan, Punitive
Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of the Legal Change, 61 MINN.
L. REV. 207, 216-20 (1977).
39. See Priest, supra note I, at 3 (tort reform has been a product of state legislation).
40. As early as 1851, the Supreme Court recognized authoritative criticisms of the punitive
damages doctrine had been advanced by commentators. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 362, 371 (1851). In that trespass action, however, the Court affirmed the availability of
exemplary damages citing an extensive judicial history allowing such awards as "the best
exposition of what the law is." Id. Since that decision, however, a minority of courts have
rejected such awards. E.g., Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., 198 Mass. 538, 543, 84 N.E.
1018, 1020 (1908) (exemplary or punitive damages will not be awarded in libel actions); Miller
v. Kingsley, 194 Nev. 123, 124, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (1975) (stating that it is a fundamental
rule of law in Nebraska not to award "punitive, vindictive, or exemplary" damages); Spokane
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punitive damages have been grounded in an array of theories including
contentions that they provide a windfall to the plaintiff; that no proven
deterrent effect has ever been correlated with the imposition of punitive
damages; that the measure of damages which usually recognize such intan-
gible losses as pain and suffering are adequate to compensate the plaintiff;
and, that lack of clearly defined standards for juries to follow necessarily
leads to injustice. 4' Moreover, many of the criticisms leveled against punitive
damages are directed at the procedures used in awarding them.
The procedures used to assess and award punitive damages are, allowing
for a few modifications, generally the same for all jurisdictions.4 2 The initial
step in a claim for punitive damages is the determination by the trial judge
of whether or not the evidence will support an exemplary award. In a jury
trial the court must decide as a threshold matter if the jury will consider the
matter of punitive damages. 43 Once this initial burden is satisfied, the trier
of fact must determine whether to award punitive damages." Because none
of the states allow punitive damages upon demand, 45 juries must, in their
discretion, determine on the facts of a specific case whether punitive damages
Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 56, 25 P. 1072, 1075 (1891) (referring to the doctrine
of punitive damages as "unsound in principle").
The propriety of punitive damages continues to inspire debate, no less so than at the time
of Day v. Woodworth. See, e.g., Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive
Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 n. I (1983) (citing series of leading cases and scholarly
works addressing the criticisms and issues surrounding the propriety of punitive damages).
41. D. DOBBS, supra note 12, § 3.9, at 219-20. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note
12, at § 77 (discussing arguments for and against punitive damages).
42. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness,
Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 46 (1983).
43. Ghiardi, Punitive Damage Awards: An Expanded Judicial Role, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 33,
33 (1988). This initial review is intended to determine whether or not the case is an appropriate
candidate for punitive damages. The court therefore must focus on whether facts indicate the
defendant acted intentionally or in a manner which is sufficiently outrageous to warrant the
imposition of punitive damages. This initial inquiry is not designed to determine definitively
whether punitive damages will be awarded in the case, but is instead intended to determine
simply whether the facts could legally support an exemplary award should the jury decide to
render one. Should the facts support such a finding, the exemplary damage issue may be
submitted to the jury. Id. (citing Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 298, 194 N.W.2d
437, 457 (1980)); see also Jackson v. Pool Mortgage Co., 868 F.2d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 1989)
(the question of sufficiency of evidence to justify an exemplary award is an issue of law to be
determined by the court).
44. Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311, 1320 (5th Cir. 1985); Seltzer, supra note 42, at 47.
It is commonly stated that punitive damages "are not a favorite of the law." See, e.g., Jackson
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 526 (5th Cir. 1984) (punitive damages are not
favored by law since they serve as punishment and an example to others). Due to their suspect
status, punitive damages are treated cautiously by the courts. Dempsey v. Holiday Utilities
Corp., 107 II. App. 3d 467, 475, 437 N.E.2d 694, 701 (5th Dist. 1982) (punitive damages may
be recovered within narrow limits, although the court must use caution in awarding such
measures).
45. D. DOBBS, supra note 12, § 3.9, at 204.
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are warranted and, if so, what amount to award. 46 The trial judge will
normally provide minimal instructions to the jury, such as directing them to
consider "the purpose of punitive damages, the culpability of the defendant's
conduct, the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries and the wealth of
the defendant. '47 Should the jury grant the claim for punitive damages, the
award is subject to review by the trial and appellate courts.4 1 If the reviewing
court finds the award is inappropriate in measure, it may reduce the amount, 49
exercise a remittitur ° or order a new trial." However, the standard used in
reviewing punitive awards is deferential, as the jury is considered the body
best capable of determining the appropriate level of punishment in a given
case.12
When analyzing punitive damages awards courts utilize a variety of stan-
dards of review, many of which have been criticized as unclear.53 Professors
46. E.g., Audiovox Corp. v. Moody, 737 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (the court
must make clear to the jury that they have discretion to award punitive damages); Briswell v.
Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 86 (Utah 1987) (case law consistently holds that whether punitive damages
are awarded is within the discretion of the jury); Seltzer, supra note 42, at 47 (discussing the
jury's discretion and the court's instructions).
47. Seltzer, supra note 42, at 47. The latitude provided juries in assessing punitive damages
awards has prompted concern in a number of courts including the United States Supreme Court
which stated: "In most jurisdictions, jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only
by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in
wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused." Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
While the determination of the amount of a punitive damage award is left 'to the jury's
discretion, the instructions regarding whether or not to impose such an award are somewhat
more exact. For example, Arkansas requires that in order to justify any award of punitive
damages in a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove "(1) negligent or intentional misconduct,
(2) that the defendant knew or should have known that the action would naturally or probably
result in injury, [and] (3) that the action was continued in reckless disregard for the consequences
from which malice can be inferred." Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 790 F.2d 552, 557 (6th
Cir. 1986).
48. Seltzer, supra note 42, at 47-48; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment d
(1979). See, e.g., Tolliver v. Amici, 800 F.2d 149, 151 (7th Cir. 1986) (an award of punitive
damages may be set aside if it exceeds the amount required to achieve the goals of deterrence
and punishment); Gray v. Allison Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 348, 359, 370
N.E.2d 747, 754 (1977) (while appellate courts are normally reluctant to interfere with an award
of punitive damages, where such awards are the result of jury passion or prejudice, they may
be overturned).
49. Pitts Truck Air, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 801, 803, 328 S.E.2d 416,
418 (1985) (a court upon its own motion can correct or set aside a judgment for punitive
damages if done prior to entrance of final judgment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
comment d (1979).
50. Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp. 403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court granted
remittitur to reduce punitive damage award from $5,000,000 to $1,500,000); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment d (1979).
51. Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 757, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 247
(1980) (case remanded for new trial on issue of punitive damages because award was excessive);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment d (1979).
52. Petsch v. Florom, 538 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 1975).
53. See, e.g., Mallor & Roberts, supra note 15, at 663 ("[T]here is a danger that the paucity
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Schlueter and Redden discuss two standards which have been used in re-
viewing punitive damages: (1) "passion, prejudice or corruption of the jury";
and, (2) the "reasonable relation rule." '5 4 Under the first standard, the court
will overturn or adjust a verdict if it is found to be the result of appeals to
passion or prejudice of the trier of fact." Applications of this rule vary
among the courts. Some courts will attempt to determine if prejudice has
affected the award by looking only at the total amount of punitive damages.5 6
Others compare the punitive 'award to the amount allowed for compensatory
damages in an attempt to find some reflection of prejudice or passion.
However, most courts utilizing this approach will not attempt to determine
any specific factor which introduced prejudice into the deliberations of the
jury. 8
The second standard of review, the reasonable relation rule,5 9 requires the
amount of punitive damages to bear some reasonable relation to the award
given for actual damages. Courts have not established any standard ratio to
use when determining this elusive standard, but rather, have tailored the
concerns of reasonableness to the facts of the case at hand. ° This has led
some critics to argue that the standard is little more than a means of
rationalizing awards rather than actually determining them.61 Proponents of
of standards regarding punitive damages may cause the judge to hesitate to disturb the jury's
award, feeling that his or her judgment is no better than the jury's.").
54. 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at § 6.1(B)-(C).
55. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160 (1967) (even if punitive damages
are warranted, a court cannot uphold a verdict based on prejudice); Minneapolis, St. Paul &
Sault St. Marie Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521 (1931) (a verdict based on passion or
prejudice cannot stand); Nevada Nat'l Leasing Co. v. Hereford, 36 Cal. 3d 146, 153, 680 P.2d
1077, 1081, 203 Cal. Rptr. 118, 123 (1984) (an award of punitive damages should be set aside
only when the entire record, when viewed most favorable to the defendant, indicates the jury
was influenced by passion or prejudice).
56. E.g., Twin City Bank v. Isaacs, 283 Ark. 127, 136, 672 S.W.2d 651, 656 (1984) (punitive
award not "grossly excessive" or prompted by passion or prejudice); Crutcher-Rolfs-Cummings,
Inc. v. Ballard, 540 S.W.2d 380, 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (measure of punitive damages
award is within discretion of the jury and should not be set aside unless it is so large as to
indicate it was the result of passion or prejudice).
57. E.g., Molex, Inc. v. Nolen, 759 F.2d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 1985) (exemplary damages of
twice the compensatory award not so large as to indicate the verdict was a result of passion,
caprice or prejudice); Petsch v. Florom, 538 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 1975) (there is no fixed
ratio between actual and punitive damages but the award must not be so disproportionate as
to be a result of passion or prejudice).
58. Compare Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (deter-
mination that the punitive damages award was based on passion or prejudice from excessive
amount of the award) with Puz v. McDonald, 140 Ariz. 77, 79, 680 P.2d 213, 215 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1977) (the sole fact that a punitive damages award exceeded the defendant's present assets
was not necessarily grounds to set aside the award); see also I L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN,
supra note 17, at § 6.1(B) (providing citations to courts applying the standard).
59. 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at § 6.1.
60. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 819, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 388
(1981); Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1983).
61. Morris, supra note 15, at 1180.
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the rule contend it provides the courts with a rough, yet effective device for
paring down excessive awards. 62
The standards and procedures used to assess and award punitive damages
have been attacked on a variety of constitutional grounds and provisions. 63
The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause has provided one source
of criticism.64 First amendment concerns figure prominently in discussions
of punitive damages in defamation actions. 65 Focusing on the punitive goals
of exemplary damages, commentators have compared the awards to quasi-
criminal sanctions and questioned whether the criminal safeguards found in
the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments should be applied to claims for
punitive damages. 66 This Note will limit its examination of the constitution-
ality of punitive damages to the requirements of three specific provisions:
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, the excessive fines clause
of the eighth amendment, and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
1. The Double Jeopardy Clause
The United States Constitution provides that no person shall twice be put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offensive conduct. 6' The principle
aim of exemplary damages is clearly punitive in nature.68 Therefore, the very
language of the double jeopardy clause would seem to preclude bringing a
claim for punitive damages if the defendant has previously been subject to
criminal prosecution or civil punishment for the same conduct. The Supreme
62. Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 908-909, 453 P.2d 551, 557-58 (1969).
63. See generally Wheeler, supra note 40 (discussing due process and excessive fine consid-
erations).
64. See, e.g., Leitner, Punitive Damages: A Constitutional Assessment, 38 FED'N. INS.
CORP. CouNS. Q. 119, 132-33 (1988). The author argues that punitive damages are similar to
criminal sanctions for purposes of constitutional analysis. Criminal sanctions cannot be meted
out according to the wealth of the defendant. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
Thus, to issue a punitive damages award based on the wealth of the defendant violates the
concept of equal protection. Leitner, supra, at 133.
65. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (due to their chilling
effect on constitutionally protected speech, punitive damages cannot be awarded in defamation
cases absent a showing of actual malice); Comment, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages
in Libel Actions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1382 (1977) (punitive damages should be abolished in
public figure libel actions in order to protect the interest in free speech and debate guaranteed
by the first amendment).
66. See generally Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34
U. Cm. L. REV. 408 (1967). Although punitive damages bear a striking similarity to criminal
sanctions, fundamental policy considerations underlying criminal safeguards do not apply to
claims for exemplary awards. Examination of the nature and consequences of punitive damages
does, however, call for protections such as an increased burden of persuasion for the plaintiff
and the right to trial by jury. Id. at 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN supra note 17, at § 7.2(A)
(discussing criminal procedure safeguards).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Court, however, has held that the concerns addressed by the double jeopardy
clause are limited to the context of criminal proceedings and therefore has
refused to extend its protections to a case involving civil punishment.6 9
This distinction between civil and criminal punishment has been critical in
the Court's application of double jeopardy protections. 70 In the Court's
analysis, "[jeopardy describes the risk ... traditionally associated with a
criminal prosecution. '71 In Breed v. Jones the Court explained that the
protections of the double jeopardy clause were established to protect the
defendant from twice being subjected to the difficulties associated with
defending against an action brought by the government. The purpose and
potential consequences of a criminal proceeding, coupled with the resources
of the State, inject into the criminal trial pressures-psychological, physical
and financial-not normally associated with private civil litigation. Such
concerns justified the protections of the double jeopardy clause. 72 These
specific pressures are not present when the party is defending against a civil
claim rather than a criminal charge and therefore no double jeopardy
protection is invoked in the civil context. Public disapprobation and long
lasting stigmatization generally do not accompany an assessment of punitive
damages as they do a criminal conviction. 7 Therefore, the distinction between
criminal and civil punishment has generally precluded the application of the
double jeopardy clause to cases involving punitive damages.
While the double jeopardy clause generally does not apply to cases other
than criminal prosecutions, courts have recognized proceedings in which the
protections of the double jeopardy clause may apply. 74 In quasi-criminal
proceedings, courts analyze the nature of the punishment involved and the
purpose of the civil sanctions in order to determine whether the punishment
is so penal in nature as to require the application of the double jeopardy
69. E.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1956) ("Congress may
impose both a criminal and civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double
jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice or attempting a second time to punish criminally
for the same offense.").
70. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975) (the risk involved in double jeopardy
is apparent only in criminal proceedings).
71. Id. See also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
235-36 (1972) (risk encompassed in double jeopardy clause is not present in proceedings which
are not essentially criminal in nature).
72. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. at 530.
73. As one commentator has mentioned, "[t]here is no blank on a job application for
listing past punitive damage judgments." Comment, supra note 66, at 411. But see Wheeler,
supra note 40, at 283 (although there is a stigma associated with the word "criminal," despite
the nature of the crime itself, the stigma arising from a punitive damage award may be of
greater or equal magnitude).
74. See, e.g., United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572-77 (1931) (although double
jeopardy issue not resolved, civil action to recover taxes under the Willis-Campbell Act is
punitive in nature and barred by a prior criminal conviction for the same offense); Coffey v.
United States, 116 U.S. 436, 442-45 (1886) (criminal acquittal on charge of failure to pay taxes
on liquor barred subsequent in rem action for the forfeiture of liquor and stills).
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clause. 7 However, those suits which the Court has recognized as quasi-
criminal involved statutory provisions which had granted the government an
option between criminal or civil remedies. 76 The defendants in these cases
were therefore faced with the pressures and disadvantages inherent in op-
posing the government, and the concerns of double jeopardy were thus
implicated. However, in a case involving punitive damages between private
litigants, no such concerns arise since the government plays no role as an
interested party. Therefore, the special concerns which are implicated when
defending against the government do not arise in a civil case between private
litigants. Thus, in spite of the analogies between punitive damages and
criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions, the double jeopardy clause generally
does not apply to cases of punitive damages between private litigants."'
2. The Excessive Fines Clause
A second argument against the constitutionality of punitive damages and
the procedures for awarding them is based on the eighth amendment's
excessive fines clause.78 This amendment provides in part: "[E]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted." '7 9 In light of the increasing severity and magnitude of
punitive awards, concerns regarding the excessiveness of such damages are
well-founded. 0 Courts, however, have been generally unreceptive to the
75. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the Court set out considerations
for determining whether a sanction was sufficiently penal for purposes of applying the procedural
protections of the fifth and sixth amendments. The Mendoza-Martinez Court reasoned that
when deciding whether to apply these provisions a court must consider:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment, retribution, and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.
Id. at 168-69.
76. E.g., United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
77. United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1903 (1989) (the double jeopardy clause does
not apply to litigation between private parties); see also McMahon Food Co. v. Call, 406
N.E.2d 1206, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (punitive damages may be awarded even though the
same illegal act may subject the defendant to criminal liability); but see C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 12, § 77, at 276 (facing civil punitive damages and criminal prosecution violates the spirit-
if not the letter-of the double jeopardy clause).
78. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 2, at 151-58 (arguing against the use of punitive damages
on the basis of the excessive fines clause).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
80. A statistical study showed the average recorded punitive damage award in Cook County
Illinois rose from $4,000 in 1960-64 to $489,000 in 1980-84. M. PETERSON, PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 11 (1985). Whereas multimillion dollar awards were previously
the rare exception, they are becoming increasingly commonplace and punitive damages have
even topped the billion dollar plateau. See Texaco, Inc., v. Penzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987) (compensatory damages of $7.53 billion affirmed, remittitur of $2 billion
reduced punitive damages to $1 billion), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1305 (1988).
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argument that punitive damages violate the excessive fines clause and a recent
Supreme Court decision expressly rejected this argument.
In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco,1 the Court rejected the claim that
the excessive fines clause barred a six million dollar punitive damages award
in litigation between private parties. In rejecting this contention, the Court
examined the provisions of the eighth amendment in light of its language
and history, 82 the traditions developed at English common law which shaped
the background against which the amendment was adopted, 3 and any con-
siderations which may be presented in the current context of the litigation,
which were not evident at the time the amendment was framed. 4 The Court
81. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989). The important questions of constitutional law addressed in that
case arose from an unlikely source: the waste-disposal business. Id. at 2912. Browning-Ferris
Industries operated a nationwide waste collection business and was involved in a price reduction
campaign aimed at driving its competitor, Kelco Disposal, Inc., out of the Burlington market.
Kelco consequently sued Browning-Ferris, alleging violations of the federal antitrust and state
tort laws. Kelco won a jury verdict for $51,146 in compensatory damages and $6,000,000 in
punitive damages. Id. at 2913.
82. Id. at 2914-15. The Court indicated that although the ratification of the amendment
created little debate and thus a sparse record on which to determine the intent of its framers,
the widely-accepted definition of "fine" limited the term to payments made to the government
for some offense. Such sanctions, historically, were imposed only in criminal actions. Id. This
factor, combined with the impulses that inspired the adoption of the Bill of Rights-a distrust
of governmental power and a demand for limitations against its abuse-prompted the Court
to read the eighth amendment as a check on the prosecutorial power of the government and
not as a provision affecting civil damages. Id. at 2915.
The Browning-Ferris Industries Court found the historical development of the amendment
provided added support for limiting the applications of the excessive fines clause. The eighth
amendment was based directly on the Virginia Declaration of Rights which in turn was based
on the English Bill of Rights. That document was designed to curb the excesses of the English
judges under the reign of James I] and the framers of the Constitution were clearly aware of
this history when adopting the eighth amendment. Id. at 2916. Thus, the Court concluded that
the history and language of the excessive fines clause limit the application of that provision to
fines exacted by and paid to the government. Id.
83. 109 S. Ct. at 2916-19. In an attempt to influence the Court's interpretation of the
amendment, Browning-Ferris argued that English history prior to the adoption of the Magna
Carta and the ensuing responses to the abuses of that period dictated applying the eighth
amendment to civil penalties as well as criminal. Id. at 2916-17. During this period, the English
crown held, and often abused, the power to impose the penalty of amercements on its subjects.
This punishment, which was ostensibly a fine payable to the crown, was applied to criminal as
well as civil offenses. The arbitrary imposition of these penalties led to the adoption of several
provisions in the Magna Carta which limited the use of amercements and served as the forerunner
to the protections embodied in the excessive fines clause. Id. at 2917-18. The Court, however,
found the mere fact that the amercements were a civil as well as criminal remedy failed to
justify the extension of the excessive fines clause to civil actions. The dispositive fact, rather,
was that the amercements were paid to the government and the provisions which were later
aimed at restricting the abuse of the power of amercement were aimed at limiting governmental
power. Id. at 2918-19.
84. Id. at 2919-20. While the Court found the excessive fines clause was intended by its
framers to serve as a check on governmental prosecutions, historical considerations alone were
not sufficient to foreclose its application in cases involving private civil litigation. Because it
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found that the guiding factor in the application of eighth amendment pro-
tections was a concern with the limitation of governmental action. Absent
state abuse of power the safeguards of the excessive fines clause are simply
not implicated. The mere facts that punitive damages are imposed through
the authority of the courts and that governmental interests are advanced
through the admonitory functions of the awards fail to raise the requisite
concern over governmental prosecutorial abuses which the Court finds central
to the eighth amendment."5 Therefore, the excessive fines clause is not
intended to address any problem which may exist in the procedure for
awarding punitive damages between private parties.8 6
Throughout its opinion, the Browing-Ferris Industries Court indicated that
the case law concerning the application of the eighth amendment generally
had been limited to concerns "with criminal process and with direct actions
initiated by government to inflict punishment. '8 7 However, the Court ex-
plicitly refused to determine whether the eighth amendment was limited only
to criminal cases, and instead held only that it did not apply to punitive
damages in a suit where the government played no role in the litigation and
had no right to a share of the award. 8 By analyzing the history and
development of the eighth amendment's excessive fines clause, the Court
determined the provision was intended as a check against governmental abuse
of power and the concerns embodied in the clause were therefore not
implicated in a suit between private litigants. 9 The analysis applied in
Browning-Ferris Industries and the general interpretation given to the crim-
inal safeguards such as the double jeopardy clause outlined above, indicate
that the protections of the fifth and eighth amendments will not have any
direct bearing on punitive damages litigation °
3. The Due Process Clause
Courts and commentators have questioned whether current punitive dam-
ages procedures violate the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
was attempting to determine the scope of constitutional protections, the Court was obligated
to consider more than the "mischief which gave it birth." Id. at 2919 (quoting Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). Therefore, the Court examined the history of the
punitive damages doctrine in order to determine if developments subsequent to the adoption
of the eighth amendment dictated extending its application to cover such awards. The concept
of punitive damages, however, was already well-established at the time the eighth amendment
was adopted. Id. at 2919. Although the protections of the eighth amendment may be properly
extended beyond the particular context to which the framers intended them to apply, the Court
found the context of punitive damages awards in litigation between private parties an inappro-
priate case for this extension. Id. at 2920.
85. 109 S. Ct. at 2920.
86. Id. at 2920.
87. Id. at 2912. Cf. supra note 69 and accompanying text (double jeopardy clause applied
only to criminal proceedings).
88. 109 S. Ct. at 2914.
89. Id. at 2920.
90. See generally Comment, supra note 66, at 434-35 (fundamental differences between
punitive damages and criminal sanctions prohibit extension of constitutionally based procedural
safeguards to civil context).
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amendments. 9' Such appraisals focus on the current procedures for assessing
exemplary damages and ask if they satisfy the due process demand for
fundamentally fair proceedings and guarantee each party an opportunity to
present her case and receive a ruling on its merits. 92 When determining if
the standards of the due process clause are satisfied in any given factual
context, one must first determine whether those criteria are invoked in the
particular case. 93
In order to trigger application of due process concepts, two requisites must
be satisfied. First, there should be some form of government action and,
second, there must be an attempted deprivation of a "life, liberty or prop-
erty" interest. 94 The state action requirement prevents due process concerns
from playing a role in a solely private transaction. Yet the state action
requirement is less strenuous than the demands of the double jeopardy and
excessive fines clauses. Those provisions require the government to assume
the interests of an adversary party before their protections are implicated. 96
While due process concerns are triggered if the state is involved as a party
to the litigation in either a criminal prosecution or a civil proceeding, 97 these
standards also come into play where the government merely transfers prop-
erty between individuals pursuant to its enforcement power. 98 The due process
91. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2923 (Brennan,
J., concurring) (current punitive damages procedures provide insufficient guidance to jury to
avoid difficulty of arbitrary imposition of awards); Bankers Life & Casualty v. Crenshaw, 108
S. Ct. 1645, 1654-56 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (jury discretion in awarding punitive
damages may violate due process clause); In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1004
(3d Cir.) (substantive due process may prohibit punitive damages claims in asbestos-related
product liability cases), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. School District of
Lancaster, 479 U.S. 852 (1986). See also Wheeler, supra note 40, at 272 (current procedures
violate substantive due process considerations elaborated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge).
92. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982).
93. Heese v. DeMatteis Dev. Corp., 417 F. Supp. 864, 870-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (question
of whether due process applies is separate and distinct from what process is due).
94. Banks v. Block, 700 F.2d 292, 295 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 934 (1983). See
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law"); id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law").
The scope of the protections provided by the due process clauses is defined in part by the
word "person." This term has been given a broad definition by the courts. Tucker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (covering minors); Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (covering illegal aliens); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (corporate speech is guaranteed through the protection of liberty in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
95. Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 97 (3d Cir. 1984) (the fifth and
fourteenth amendments protect individuals only from governmental action), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1015 (1985).
96. See supra notes 70-73, 81-86 and accompanying text (the dangers addressed by the
double jeopardy and excessive fines clauses are not normally a part of private civil litigation).
97. E.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966).
98. Wheeler, supra note 40, at 277. The author cites Supreme Court cases outlining due
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clause therefore, may protect civil defendants who are hoping to protect
their property, and civil plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances. 99
The second requirement is that the state action be used to deprive the
party of her life, liberty or property. Before state authority can be invoked
in order to deprive a party of a constitutionally protected interest, a hearing
must be held. °° Those interests which are protected by due process are not
created by the Constitution but rather are defined by independent rules such
as state laws.' 0' A person has property interests sufficient to invoke due
process protections where rules which she may invoke at a hearing support
her claim of entitlement to that benefit. 0 The parties' interests in a claim
for a punitive damages award (which is based on state law) therefore qualify
as a property interest for purposes of due process analysis. The due process
clause thus, has been held to protect defendants in punitive damages ac-
tions. 103
Provided the threshold requirements of the due process clause are satisfied,
one must next ask exactly what process is due. The due process clause
requires the government to provide fundamentally fair proceedings whenever
its qualifying factors are satisfied, 1°4 and thus acts as a "fundamental guar-
antee of fairness, our protection against arbitrary, capricious, and unrea-
sonable" deprivations.0 5 This requires that each participant be provided a
suitable opportunity to present her case and have the court judge its merits.10 6
The demands of the due process clause, however, escape precise definition.
It is not a technical conception with a fixed content, but is related to time,
place and circumstances. 0 7 The flexible nature of due process demands,
therefore, calls for consideration of an independent sense of justice-one
that exists independent of any judicial procedures-when determining whether
the procedures of a given case reflect a sense of fundamental fair play. 09
Various factors, including the degree of potential deprivation the party may
suffer, must be considered in this analysis. 0 9
process considerations involved in property transfers, including: North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See also
Wheeler, supra note 40, at 278 n.40 (when a court compels a defendant to relinquish his
property to a plaintiff, this necessarily constitutes state action).
99. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982).
100. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-71 (1970).
101. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).
102. FDIC v. Morrison, 747 F.2d 610, 614 (lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1019
(1985).
103. Wheeler, supra note 40, at 277 (citing Logan, 455 U.S. at 419).
104. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
105. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Logan, 455 U.S. at 433.
107. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
108. See Wheeler, supra note 40, at 277 (despite the fact that a specific procedural safeguard
was not required in the past, present circumstances may dictate such a requirement).
109. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-64 (1970).
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In an effort to provide a clear methodology for ascertaining the adequacy
of the procedural protection afforded in a given case, the Supreme Court
has established a three-step test designed to determine the fundamental
fairness of specific procedures. In Mathews v. Eldridge,"10 the Court stated:
[Ildentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: [f]irst, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous dep-
rivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.'
In the context of punitive damages actions, the private interest involved is
the money which constitutes the punitive award; the risk of erroneous
deprivation of this interest is introduced through the vague standards gen-
erally used in assessing punitive damages."12 The government's interest in
applying punitive damages through these procedures does not weigh heavily
against changes that may eliminate current inequities without creating undue
strains on the judicial process." 3
Given the interplay between these interests, it has been questioned whether
current procedures used to assess punitive damages violate due process
requirements by failing to provide sufficient guidance to the jury entrusted
with the responsibility of applying these sanctions." 4 While the Supreme
Court has not yet directly addressed the question of whether unchecked jury
discretion in awarding punitive damages violates the due process clause," 5
110. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
111. Id. at 335.
112. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing jury discretion).
113. See generally Wheeler, supra note 40, at 303-11 (discussing the government's interest in
imposing punitive damages).
114. Browning-Ferris Industries, 109 S. Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring) (the guidance
given to the jury in the form of an instruction informing them that they may take into account
"the character of the defendants, their financial standing, and the nature of their acts" was
"scarcely better than no guidance at all"). See also D. DOBBS, supra note 12, at § 3.9 (jury
granted discretion in assessing punitive damages but has no objective basis by which to measure
the award, thus inviting prejudice and irrationality). See generally Wheeler, supra note 40
(requirements of the due process clause demand additional procedural safeguards for punitive
damages defendants).
115. Browning-Ferris Industries, 109 S. Ct. at 2921. While the Court has not yet specifically
addressed this issue, it has indicated a willingness to consider what limits the due process clause
place on awarding punitive damages. See Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S.
Ct. 1645, 1650 (1988) (noting that a vague appeal to constitutional principles based on the
amount of a punitive damages award was insufficient to preserve the issues on appeal); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986) (noting that the lack of sufficient standards
governing punitive damages gives rise to due process and other constitutional concerns). After
denying certiorari in a number of cases which presented due process challenges to punitive
damages procedures, on April 2, 1990 the Court agreed to hear arguments on this issue. See
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, No. 89-1279 (WESTLAW, S CT library).
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strong arguments support the need for reform." 6 The concerns implicated
under the due process clause are even more acute in cases involving mass
tort litigation.
C. Mass Tort Litigation and Specific Problems of Punitive Damage
Procedures
An array of situations may give rise to multiple lawsuits against a limited
number of defendants arising out of a single course of conduct. This Note
will refer to such claims as mass tort litigation. Airplane crashes," 7 structural
collapses,"18 and defective consumer products" 9 are all examples of situations
engendering numerous claims against a limited number of defendants.2 0 The
magnitude of mass tort litigation has created strains on the judicial system
and prompted courts and commentators to question the efficacy of current
procedures in addressing these claims.' 2 '
116. See Wheeler, supra note 40, at 278-84. Professor Wheeler provides a sustained analysis
of current punitive damages procedures in light of the Mathews requirements. The private
interest involved in the awarding of punitive damages includes both monetary loss and the
stigma attending such a judgement. Id. Current procedures create a substantial risk of erroneous
deprivation by allowing factors such as imprecise standards for assessing and reviewing the
awards. Also problematic is the practice of admission into evidence of facts directed toward
establishing punitive damages claims prior to the determination on any underlying claim of
liability and compensatory damages. Id. at 284-93. Professor Wheeler provides a number of
procedural safeguards which may alleviate the risks of erroneous decisions. These include
eliminating the availability of punitive damages in selected classes of cases, allowing evidence
of prior punitive damages imposed for the same conduct, increasing the burden of proof,
establishing legislative limits on punitive awards, bifurcating punitive damages trials, or leaving
the determination of punitive damages to the court. Id. at 293-303. While government interests
in imposing punitive damages include deterrence, retribution and compensation, these interests
need not be sacrificed in order to implement a number of the reforms Wheeler suggests. Id. at
304-22.
117. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois On May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d 1189
(7th Cir.) (diversity suit involving wrongful death claims filed by survivors of victims of the
crash of American Airlines DC-10 on take-off from O'Hare International Airport), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 866 (1983).
118. E.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.) (diversity suit filed by
victims and survivors of collapse of two skywalks at the Kansas City Hyatt), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 988 (1982).
119. E.g., In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" I.U.D. Products Liability
Litigation, 526 F. Supp 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
120. Perhaps the most often cited and extensive example of mass tort litigation is the current
deluge of suits engulfing the asbestos industry. In a 1986 opinion, the Third Circuit described
the maelstrom of litigation surrounding this industry as unparalleled in American tort law. See
In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915
(1986). As of 1986, over 30,000 personal injury suits had been filed against asbestos manufac-
turers and producers and estimates indicated an additional 180,000 such claims would be filed
by the year 2010. Celotex Corp. v. School Dist. of Lancaster, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
121. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, 378 F.2d 832, 838-42 (2d Cir. 1967) (punitive
damages rendered in jurisdictions throughout the country cannot be administered so as to avoid
overkill); Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc. 433 F. Supp. 384, 385 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (punitive damages
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1. Cumulative Effects of Multiple A wards
The problems associated with mass tort litigation and the scale of punitive
and compensatory awards which accompany them are a recent phenome-
non. 2 2 The first instance of mass tort litigation in the context of products
liability actions involved the MER/29 cases. Over 1,500 personal injury and
products liability suits were brought against the manufacturer of MER/29,
a drug designed to lower blood cholesterol levels which was subsequently
found to cause cataracts. In spite of its knowledge of the risks associated
with the drug, the manufacturer, Richardson-Merrell, delayed sending out a
warning letter and did not withdraw the drug from the market for over one
year after learning of its serious side effects. 123 Nearly all of the plaintiffs
in the MER/29 cases filed claims for punitive damages. The degree of
potential liability prompted the Second Circuit, in the case of Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, to express concern over the implications and possible
results should a majority of these claims succeed. 124
Central to the Roginsky court's concern was the problem of overkill,
whereby the cumulative effects of the punitive and compensatory claims
would bankrupt the defendant. This problem was most acute in light of the
possibility that punitive claims from earlier suits could have exhausted the
resources of the defendants resulting in an inability to satisfy substantiated
claims for compensatory damages in actions which were filed later in the
overall course of the litigation. 25 Perhaps because of these issues, over 95%
of the MER/29 cases were eventually settled out of court and only three
jury verdicts rendered punitive awards. 26 These results led to speculation
that the concern regarding overkill was not justified. Yet, the large increase
in multiple punitive damages verdicts in mass tort cases nevertheless makes
the possibility of overkill impossible to ignore. 27
are available under Wisconsin law only in cases involving intentional torts; products liability
case therefore did not justify a claim for punitive damages because the conduct involved was
no more than gross negligence); Ausness, supra note 20, at 93-120 (punitive damages are
ineffective in the context of products liability cases and reforms are needed to alleviate excesses
inherent 4n the remedy as applied); Ghiardi & Kircher, Punitive Damages Recovery in Products
Liability Cases, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 5-43 (1981) (examining various theories and developments
in punitive damages doctrines and application in products liability actions); Rabin, Dealing with
Disasters, 30 STAN. L. REv. 281, 283 (1978) (mass disasters often present unprecedented
difficulties which diminish efficacy of judicial systems); Sales, The Emergence of Punitive
Damages in Product Liability Actions: A Further Assault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J.
351, 388-403 (1983) (punitive damages are incompatible with products liability litigation due to
social costs associated with overkill and conceptual incongruities with strict liability standards).
122. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 3, at 14.
123. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, 378 F.2d 832, 835-36 (2d Cir. 1967).
124. Id. at 838-42 (the vast liability of defendant and the decentralization of the overall
litigation could result in extreme levels of damages, and current litigation procedures are
ineffective in avoiding this problem of overkill).
125. Id. at 839.
126. See Seltzer, supra note 42, at 54 (of the three punitive damage awards, the award in
Roginsky was reversed, and those in the other two cases were significantly reduced).
127. Id.
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In addition to the ill-defined standards generally characteristic of punitive
damages claims,'28 the problems evident in managing the profusion of liti-
gation deriving from mass tort situations present further challenges to the
concerns of due process. 29 Characteristics of decentralization innately as-
sociated with current litigation procedures, such as multiplicity of juries
hearing the cases and the variety of standards used in jurisdictions, produce
difficulties in awarding punitive damages in mass tort cases. 30 The current
procedures for administering these claims leave courts ill-equipped to deal
with problems such as coordinating awards in the various courts, instructing
juries as to punitive awards presented in previous cases, distributing the
awards among the plaintiffs and effectively dealing with the threat of
overkill.' 3' Whether justice is truly served under the current system of
individual litigation is questionable, as procedures often lead to the problem
of anomalous results in similar cases. 32
The substantive tort law which determines the outcome of the individual
cases that comprise the overall mass litigation phenomenon is determined by
the individual state jurisdictions. Therefore, communication between the
courts hearing the various cases is hampered.' Juries carry the burden of
assessing damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter the defendant
in light of his entire course of conduct. However, they are inherently unable
to know what punitive awards, if any, will be administered by juries in other
states in cases yet to be tried."' Furthermore, the jury is often ignorant as
to the punitive awards rendered by previous juries hearing related cases,
unless the defendant were to provide such information during the trial-a
highly unattractive strategy which may only invite larger punishments. 33 This
128. See supra notes 47-66 and accompanying text (the jury's discretion is usually limited
only by the general rule not to award excessive damages).
129. Seltzer, supra note 42, at 40.
Such decentralization raises important issues including the extent to which a defen-
dant may be punished for a single course of tortious conduct, what the jury should
be told about previous awards by other juries or about other punitive damages
claims against the same defendant, and how awards should be distributed ....
Id.
130. Id.
131. See D. DOBBS, supra note 12, at § 3.9 (current state procedures are unequipped to
handle recent phenomena of mass tort litigation); Seltzer, supra note 42, at 40 (possible solutions
to correct the problem are establishing ceilings on punitive damages and eliminating the jury's
role in determining the amount of punitive damages).
132. See I L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at § 4.4(A)(5)(b)(2) (discussing the
disparity among the verdicts in the MER/29 cases). See also RAND CORPORATION, ASBESTOS IN
THE COURTS 42 (1985) ("sick people and people who died a terrible death from asbestos are
being turned away from the courts, while people with minimal injuries who may never suffer
severe asbestos disease are being awarded hundreds of thousands of dollars, and even in excess
of a million dollars").
133. See Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839 (the solution, which is not feasible, is for a single court
to handle all cases).
134. Id.
135. Punitive Damages: A Constructive Examination, 1986 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG., SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 72 [hereinafter, A.B.A., PUNITIVE DAMAGES].
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dearth of information will limit the jury's ability to make an informed
decision regarding just what amount of damages is needed to properly punish
the defendant without overreaching the level of reasonable retribution. 3 6
Even if an individual court were to decide a defendant had received sufficient
punishment, it would be limited to merely instructing the jury as to the
proper considerations which effect a punitive damages award; it has neither
the opportunity nor the incentive to take corrective action to avoid overkill. 3 7
The Roginsky court illustrated the limitations inherent in the current state-
based jurisdictional approach.' Prior to the Roginsky decision, the defen-
dants had been found liable for punitive damages to claimants in California
and New York.3 9 Yet, in spite of its expressed concern regarding the pos-
sibility that the defendant may be rendered insolvent by the punitive and
compensatory liability it would face as a result of its production of MER/
29, the Second Circuit court knew "of no principle whereby the first punitive
award exhausts all claims for punitive damages and would thus preclude
future judgments."140 Indeed, the only potential check on continued punitive
awards, a factor the court saw as a threat to the likelihood of future claimants
satisfying their compensatory claims, was a voluntary cessation of such
exemplary damages in all subsequent cases. This alternative was unworkable,
however, since courts handling later MER/29 suits would be unlikely to deny
local claimants punitive awards because prior claimants in remote jurisdic-
tions had "stripped the cupboard bare.' 4' The Roginsky court thus found
itself with no workable method for avoiding what it perceived as a real
threat to the just resolution of all the claims related to the production of
MER/29. The Roginsky decision therefore makes it clear that the national
scope of mass tort litigation places strains on current state-based methods
for assessing punitive damages by stretching the entire litigation process
beyond its traditional jurisdictional limits. 142
2. Multiple A wards and Due Process Issues
The threat of overkill inherent in mass tort litigation presents additional
problems in satisfying due process demands. Punitive damages are intended
136. See Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 840 (discussing limitation on jury instructions). But see
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (danger of excessive
multiple punitive damages can be avoided if the jury considered the wealth of the defendant
as well as the compensatory and punitive damages, and fines and forfeitures already imposed
or likely to be imposed on the defendant).
137. Jeffries, supra note 2, at 141-42.
138. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839-40.
139. Id. at 834 n.3. In addition to the California suit, Richardson-Merrell had also been
found liable for punitive damages in a New York state court proceeding which occurred before
the Roginsky case. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Seltzer, supra note 42, at 51-54 (discussing the scope of the Roginsky suit).
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to punish the wrongdoer but should not be so extreme as to bankrupt the
defendant. 43 Historically, the due process clause guarantees the right to a
fundamentally fair proceeding 44 which has included freedom from judicially
imposed bankruptcy. 45 The difficulties involved in coordinating the various
cases and awards arising in mass tort circumstances have recently attracted
attention. 46 The current trend toward increased damages awards has helped
make real the threat that the defendant's aggregate liability will lead to
bankruptcy. 47 Because the geographical and commercial context of a given
143. Wynn Oil Co. v. Purcolator Chem. Corp., 403 F. Supp. 226, 232 (M.D. Fla. 1974);
Maxwell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 143 Ariz. 205, 219, 693 P.2d 348, 362 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984);
International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 675 v. Lassiter, 295 So. 2d 634, 640 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974). See also Ratner v. Sioux Nat'l Gas Corp., 719 F.2d 801, 805 (5th Cir. 1983)
(excessive punishment is antithetical to the objectives of punishment and deterrence which are
effectuated by punitive awards).
The prohibition against threatening the economic viability of a civil defendant has deep roots
in the Anglo-American legal tradition. The English history surrounding the Magna Carta and
its relationship to the tradition of amercements engendered the basic tenet that punishment
should not destroy a defendant's means of making a living in a particular business. See Jeffries,
supra note 2, at 156. Professor Jeffries provides a description of the history of amercements,
a fine paid to the crown as a penalty for a broad range of offenses. Widespread abuse of this
power lead to three separate chapters in Magna Carta which limited the power of amercement.
Id.
144. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
145. See Jeffries, supra note 2, at 159 (due process of law concepts adopted as components
of the Constitution are the fundamental liberties and protections secured by the Magna Carta,
including the right to be free of judicially imposed bankruptcy). Through the Bill of Rights,
the framers of the Constitution embodied certain guarantees which had long been recognized
as essential in American and English society. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
The fifth and fourteenth amendments, with their guarantee of "due process of law," incorporate
these traditions in the Constitution. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (fundamental
principles of process of law driving from the Magna Carta are established in the due process
clause of the fifth amendment), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856) (fundamental
principles, which protect citizens' privacy and guard them from arbitrary governmental actions,
are incorporated under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
146. See supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text (concerns raised over excessive punitive
damages in a growing number of mass tort cases).
147. Defendants in asbestos related litigation have resorted to the protection of Chapter XI
of the federal bankruptcy code in a number of circumstances. Corporate giants, including
Johns-Manville, Amatex Corp., and U.N.R., have all resorted to bankruptcy courts seeking
reorganization in order to obtain relief from liability in numerous outstanding personal injury
claims. See Seltzer, supra note 42, at 39 n.12.
Perhaps the most notable use of the bankruptcy courts is the Johns-Manville case. In 1982
Johns-Manville and approximately twenty of its affiliates filed for reorganization in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York seeking relief from the
continuing burden of litigation costs related to asbestos exposure. Johns-Manville was a named
defendant in over 16,000 asbestos suits with estimates stating that figure could rise as high as
34,000. Figures set the average cost of defending each of these cases at $40,000. 10 Prod. Safety
& Liability Rep. (BNA) 573 (Aug. 27, 1982). In an effort to "preserve its continuing operations,
protect its assets and achieve even-handed treatment of asbestos-health lawsuits and the claims
of its lending institutions and trade auditors," an executive committee decided to resort to
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situation has an impact on due process theory application,' 48 current pro-
cedures used in mass tort litigation present a series of difficulties. Decisions
among the circuits are unclear as to whether these procedures satisfy the
demands of due process in mass tort claims.
49
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue of due process in
reaction to multiple exemplary awards in Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp."50 The case involved two separate suits in which plaintiffs brought
actions for personal injuries against various manufacturers of asbestos-
containing insulation products. The cases were consolidated for appeal, and
the appellate court squarely rejected the defendants' assertion that punitive
damages in multiple civil suits arising from a single course of conduct violated
the due process clause.' 5 The Cathey court found the requirements of
fundamental fairness were satisfied as a matter of law if the defendant was
able to litigate the propriety of a punitive damages award before an impartial
fact-finder." 2 The court supported this finding with its belief that the defen-
court-supervised reorganization. Id. This recourse was sought in spite of the fact that the
corporation held assets of over $2 billion and faced liabilities aside from those associated with
the asbestos litigation of only $1 billion. Id. at 574.
The staggering figures in the Johns-Manville case help to illustrate the degree of liability
faced by the defendants of asbestos litigation and the severe strains this phenomenon is placing
on litigants and courts alike. While some need for systematic control over mass tort litigation
has been expressed, it is questionable whether resort to bankruptcy courts is a suitable alternative.
See Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986) (resort to
bankruptcy court is often not the best alternative for the defendant, the plaintiff, or the court
system in a mass tort suit). Additionally, bankruptcy courts are of limited jurisdictional
authority. See Newman, Constitutional Law: Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts; Bankruptcy
Reform Act's Broad Grant of Jurisdiction Violates Article III, 60 U. DET. J. URB. L. 288
(1983). Furthermore, the bankruptcy system itself faces an already high case load. Los Angeles
Daily J., Dec. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (bankruptcy court system swamped by high caseload;
inexperienced bench with high turnover contributes to difficulties). The combination of these
factors raise questions whether the bankruptcy courts are a proper venue for settling the
problems of coordination faced in mass tort litigation. Additionally, corporate and market
based considerations discourage officers from pursuing such a course. See Roe, supra, at 7-29
(discussing corporate and market considerations affecting mass tort bankruptcy). These issues,
however, are beyond the necessarily limited scope of this Note as they extend into questions of
coordinating compensatory as well as punitive awards. For a discussion of some of the problems
faced in the resort to bankruptcy, see George, Bankruptcy for Nonbankruptcy Purposes: Are
There Any Limits?, 6 REV. LITIGATION 95 (1987) (two problems are the potential conflict with
bankruptcy goals and the violation of the insolvency requirement).
148. Parcel Tankers, Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (S.D. Tex.
1983).
149. Compare Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir. 1985)
(due process requires no more than allowing defendants to present their case before a neutral
judicial body under accepted procedures), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986) with In re School
Asbestos Litigation 789 F.2d 996, 1003-04 (3d Cir. 1986) (substantive due process may require
greater protections for the punitive damages defendant in mass tort context).
150. 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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dant should not be relieved of liability for punitive damages simply because
his behavior caused harm to a large number of people rather than only a
few. 153
A subsequent Third Circuit decision questioned the analysis of the Cathey
court. 5 4 The In re School Asbestos decision involved the review of a na-
tionwide class action certified in order to handle all punitive damages claims
stemming from the removal of asbestos insulation in Pennsylvania school
districts. In that case, the district court certified a class action due to the
strong possibility that the awarding of punitive damages to individual plain-
tiffs early would make it difficult for future claimants to do the same.'
The appellate court discussed a number of rationales for preventing multiple
assessments of punitive damages against a single defendant and recognized
that "powerful arguments have been made that as a matter of federal
constitutional law or substantive tort law, the courts shoulder some respon-
sibility for preventing repeated awards of punitive damages for the same
acts or series of acts.' ' 6 In dictum, the Third Circuit expressed concern that
the Cathey decision took an unnecessarily limited approach to the question
of whether multiple punitive awards violated the due process clause by
assuming that any procedural method for litigating the defendants' interests
was sufficient to provide due process. 1 7 Under the broader doctrine of
substantive due process, the court must determine under the factual context
of a given case whether the procedures implemented will lead to fundamen-
tally unfair or arbitrary results. 5 ' The In re School Asbestos court was
concerned with the adequacy of the current case by case adjudication of
punitive claims, but was unwilling to allow the class action vehicle to be
used to remedy the difficulties associated with punitive damages. The court
found that a class action for punitive damages would pose the problems of
underinclusiveness and conflicts between various state laws. 59 The court
therefore decertified the punitive damages class action initiated by the district
court. 160
153. Id. (citing Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658, 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (1st
Dist. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 98 I11. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983)).
154. In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir. 1986).
155. In re School Asbestos Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 422, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
156. 789 F.2d at 1005.
157. Id.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides three distinct con-
stitutional protections: it incorporates various provisions from the Bill of Rights
thereby extending their application to the states, it guarantees procedural safeguards
intended to secure a fair trial, and assures " 'substantive due process' which bars
certain arbitrary government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them."
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
158. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 337 (Stevens, J., concurring).
159. 789 F.2d at 1007.
160. Id. For further discussion of the use of class actions in the mass tort context, see infra
notes 163-76 and accompanying text.
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3. The Class Action Approach
The problems associated with mass tort litigation place heavy burdens on
the judicial system as well as on the industries and individual defendants
subject to such suits.161 The mass of litigation involving the asbestos industry
prompted one federal judge to state, "it is not an overly pessimistic prediction
that, absent some legislative or judicial solution, our attempt to try these
virtually identical lawsuits, one-by-one, will bankrupt both the state and
federal court systems.' '1 62 In an effort to manage the sheer volume of cases
arising out of similar factual circumstances, various courts have used an
approach similar to that used by the district court in the In re School
Asbestos case and have established class actions, at least with respect to all
punitive damages claims. 63
161. RAND CoR'oRATIoN, supra note 132, at 42 ("On the average, the total cost to plaintiffs
and defendants of litigating a claim was considerably greater than the amount paid in compen-
sation.").
162. Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 324 (1983).
163. E.g., In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d at 1002-08; In re "Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690, 705-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). A class action is a
procedural device which allows a group of plaintiffs with similar causes of action to sue through
one or more representatives without each of the class members being required to join the suit.
See Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Litigation of Mass Air Crashes, 29 RUTGERS
L. REV. 425, 427-28 (1976). While a class action can determine all issues in a dispute, it need
not dispose of an entire controversy and can be limited to those issues for which the procedure
is proper. See Ausness, supra note 20, at 101. Because it can be limited to defined issues, a
class action could address only the issue of punitive damages leaving the concerns of compen-
satory liability to the individual courts which try those claims.
The requirements for establishing a class action are set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23. The analysis for determining whether such an action is suitable in a given case is a two
step process. Ausness, supra note 20, at 102. The federal court must first be convinced that
the four requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied. This portion of the rule is satisfied if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). If these prerequisites are satisfied, a class action may be maintained
provided the case qualifies for one of the categories set out in Rule 23(b). Ausness, supra note
20, at 104. Those provisions most suitable to a punitive damages class action are 23(b)(l)(B)
and 23(b)(3). Id.
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provides for class actions where recovery by individual members of the class
would jeopardize the ability of other class members to satisfy their claims. FED. R. Crv. P.
23(b)(l)(B). This qualification, sometimes referred to as the limited fund class, is applicable to
mass tort litigation where the defendant faces an aggregate level of liability which threatens to
surpass the defendant's assets. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, 378 F.2d at 839-41 (pro-
viding punitive damages to early plaintiffs threatens later plaintiffs ability to recover compen-
satory awards). Under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may sustain a class action if common questions
of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and if a class
action is superior to all other methods available for trying the issues. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
The common question class may be suitable to all punitive damages claims in a mass tort case,
but some of the advantages of the class action are lost with a 23(b)(3) class because members
may opt out and pursue their individual claims independently. Ausness, supra note 20, at 119-
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Proponents of class actions in mass tort litigation contend the procedure
will benefit all parties. Plaintiffs are assured an adequate opportunity to
present their claims, can pool their resources and pay only a portion of the
litigation expenses, and avoid potential conflicts of interest among their
counsel.' 64Defendants benefit from the decreased risk of overkill and reduced
cost of litigation. 65 The procedure would also promote judicial economy by
eliminating repetitive litigation of similar facts and issues. 66
However, at least two circuit decisions reflect the difficulties involved in
establishing class actions in mass tort litigation. 67 In an effort to avoid
exhausting available funds and depriving later plaintiffs of complete recovery
on their compensatory awards, the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of California certified a class in the Dalkon Shield case with respect
to all punitive damages arising out of the manufacture and distribution of
a contraceptive device later found to cause sterility and other health problems
in the women using them. 6 The Ninth Circuit Court decertified this class
because whether the funds available were insufficient to satisfy all claims
was wholly speculative, particularly in light of the possibility that not all
plaintiffs would receive punitive awards. 69 In addition, the court held that
even if a limited fund could be established, the commonality of claims
requirement 70 could not be satisfied because the plaintiffs in these actions
resided in fifty different states which applied a variety of punitive damages
standards. 171
Similarly, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri
certified a limited fund class" 2 to encompass the issues of liability for
compensatory and punitive damages and the amount of punitive damages
164. Id. at 102.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See In re Northern District of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Liti-
gation, 693 F.2d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1982) (complexity of issues involved with individual
claims precluded aggregation of all plaintiffs into a class partial recovery; since all states did
not apply same punitive damages standard, typicality was a significant problem), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1191-92 (8th Cir. 1982)
(legitimate concern for efficient management of mass tort litigation did not override fundamental
principle of a dual system of courts to resolve legal disputes), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
168. 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1192-94 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
169. 693 F.2d at 853. The court indicated the requirements of Rule 23(b)(l)(B) required the
record to show separate punitive awards would inescapably affect later awards. Id. at 851.
170. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a)(2) (one prerequisite for a class action is that questions of law
and fact are common to the class); see also supra note 163 (mass tort litigation may be
advantageous in light of common questions regarding punitive damages claims).
171. 693 F.2d at 850.
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(B) (one prerequisite for class actions is the fact that
multiple separate actions may impair the interests of other litigants); see also supra note 163
(regarding consequences resulting from defendants' potential inability to satisfy an aggregate
level of liability).
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arising out of the collapse of a walkway at the Kansas City Hyatt. 73 The
court of appeals subsequently reversed this certification concluding that a
mandatory class in this instance violated the Anti-Injunction Act. 174 Critics
have rebuked these decisions for going too far in limiting the means available
to the federal courts for dealing with demands of mass litigation. 75 However,
courts generally reject class certification in the context of mass litigation
involving personal injury actions. 76
The ineffectiveness of the class action procedure in personal injury mass
tort claims underscores the trial courts' inability to exercise control over the
overall punitive liability in such litigation. The procedures used to litigate
these exemplary awards were developed in the context of more traditional
one-on-one litigation. With the advent of mass tort claims, the shortcomings
inherent in punitive procedures are only exacerbated by the decentralization
which results from this litigation phenomenon. Courts are thus faced with
a growing problem as punitive damages awards increase with no effective
means of control available to check their possible abuse.
II. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp.
A. Juzwin I
The Juzwin case involved a products liability action filed against asbestos-
product manufacturers. 177 Defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiff's
claims for punitive damages arguing that such awards were unconstitutional
in the context of mass tort litigation. Defendants based their constitutional
challenge on three distinct provisions: the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
173. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 418-19 (W.D. Mo. 1982), vacated, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
174. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988
(1982). The federal Anti-Injunction Act prohibits actions by federal courts interfering with the
proper conduct of business in state courts unless necessary in the aid of the federal court's
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). The Eighth Circuit held the class interfered with the
continuation of all claims already filed in state courts thus violating the Anti-Injunction Act.
680 F.2d at 1183.
175. See Tort Class Actions Doomed? Two Appellate Rulings Seem to Abort Innovative
Procedure, NAT'L L.J., July 5, 1982, p.3, col. 1; Seltzer, supra note 42, at 78-79.
176. Seltzer, supra note 42, at 69. See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1002-
08 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming denial of certification of an asbestos-related action); see also
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 527 (5th Cir. 1984) ("A single class
action for recovery of one award of punitive damages might be an attractive alternative from
a theoretical point of view, but does not appear feasible."), rev'd on other grounds, 781 F.2d
394 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Yandle v. PPG Indus. Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 571 (E.D. Tex. 1974)
(court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification because questions of law and fact were
not predominantly common, and class action was not superior method of adjudication).
177. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1054-56 (D.N.J.), reh'g granted,
718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989). The trial court's initial decision will be referred to as Juzwin
I and the opinion on rehearing will be referred to as Juzwin 11.
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amendment, the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment and the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 78 The district court separately
addressed each challenge.
In their double jeopardy argument, the defendants emphasized the parallels
between exemplary damages and criminal fines by focusing on the common
rationales underlying each sanction: deterrence and retribution. On this basis,
the defendants contended the double jeopardy protections immunized a party
from defending against punitive claims once the defendant established that
it had already faced punitive claims in a previous case arising from the same
course of conduct. 79 The court, however, rejected this argument stating,
that the double jeopardy clause is strictly limited to criminal proceedings. 80
Although the Supreme Court has extended the protections of the double
jeopardy clause to cover quasi-criminal civil proceedings,"' this application
has been allowed most frequently in government suits in which the govern-
ment was bringing an action for criminal and civil sanctions under a statute
that provided for both penalties." 2 Because punitive damages are a judicial
rather than legislative creation, the court found exemplary awards could not
constitute a quasi-criminal punishment.'8 3 Notwithstanding the close analogy
between punitive damages and criminal sanctions, 8 4 the district court found
the psychological, physical and financial concerns associated with criminal
prosecutions were not present in a claim for punitive damages and therefore
refused to apply the protections of the double jeopardy clause to a civil suit
for punitive damages between private parties.'85
Again relying on the similarity between criminal sanctions and punitive
damages, defendants argued that the eighth amendment prohibits imposing
multiple punitive damages awards in mass tort cases because over the course
of the entire litigation, their aggregate effect would result in the violation
of the excessive fines clause. 8 6 The Juzwin I court stated that while the
Supreme Court had restricted the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition
to application in criminal cases, whether the clause is also limited to criminal
proceedings is not clear. 8 7 The court again examined the defendants' claim
that punitive damages amount to a quasi-criminal sanction and thus require
178. Juzwin , 705 F. Supp. at 1057.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1058.
181. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (although the double jeopardy clause may
apply to quasi-criminal proceedings, the clause is not applicable to cases involving punitive
damage claims between private litigants).
182. Juzwin 1, 705 F. Supp. at 1058.
183. Id. at 1058-59.
184. Id. at 1058. Punitive damages are not compensatory in nature; rather, they constitute
"private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
185. Juzwin 1, 705 F. Supp. at 1058-59.
186. Id. at 1059.
187. Id. at 1059 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977)).
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specific constitutional restrictions. The defendants argued that whether a
given sanction was quasi-criminal in part depends on whether the punishment
appears excessive in relation to the purpose it is intended to achieve.'1 8 The
court found this analysis inapposite, however, as "[it would be the height
of circular reasoning to conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of
'excessive fines' applies to 'quasi-criminal' sanctions and that 'quasi-criminal'
sanctions are those which are excessive." 8 9 Therefore, rather than resolving
the ambiguity regarding the scope of the excessive fines clause, the court
disposed of this argument on evidentiary grounds. It stated that at this early
stage of the litigation, there had been no showing that the previous awards
assessed against the defendant were "excessive" and, therefore, the excessive
fines clause could not constitute a basis for striking the claims for punitive
damages. 90
While the court found that multiple awards of punitive damages for a
single course of conduct do not violate the double jeopardy clause or the
excessive fines clause, it concluded they did violate the 'fundamental fairness'
requirement of the due process clause.' 9' Distinctions between criminal, quasi-
criminal and civil proceedings were irrelevant with respect to application of
the due process clause. 92 The procedures used in assessing punitive damages
therefore must satisfy the fundamental fairness requirements of the due
process clause.
Although the methods for awarding punitive damages may be sufficient
in protecting the interests of fairness in traditional one-on-one lawsuits, the
court recognized these concerns must be reexamined in view of the recent
increase in mass tort litigation. 93 Inherent in the requirement of due process
is a protection from the arbitrary exercise of government powers.' 94 The
Juzwin I decision held current punitive damages procedures failed to satisfy
this requirement because they allowed a series of juries to award punitive
damages without providing any reasonable means by which to coordinate
the awards and realistically check the potentially unlimited extent of liability
incurred.' 9 Such procedures failed to satisfy the expectations of the due
188. Id. at 1060 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963)).
189. Id. at 1060.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1061.
192. Id. at 1060 ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
adjudicatory proceedings be fundamentally fair, whether those proceedings be in a criminal or
civil context." (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981))).
193. Id. at 1061.
194. Id. at 1062 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). See also Jeffries,
supra note 2, at 156-57 (discussion of legal principle regarding reasonable relationship between
punishment and particular offense).
195. Juzwin I, 705 F. Supp. at 1056. The court examined the various means currently
available for attempting to diminish the amount of punitive damages awarded in order to reflect
an offset for those damages already suffered by the defendant. One such method would be for
the defendant to introduce evidence at trial which establishes the amount of exemplary awards
1990]
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process clause which inquire whether the government has dealt with someone
fairly. 196 While earlier courts had been reluctant to find that the indefinite
rules governing punitive damages awards violated due process requirements,
recent decisions in various courts indicated a growing concern among the
judiciary with the propriety of these standards. 97 Most efforts to satisfy the
demands of fundamental fairness in the mass tort context have involved
efforts to establish class actions. Limitations inherent in the nature of class
actions, however, frustrated these attempts, particularly with respect to the
field of asbestos litigation. 98 Thus, efforts to tailor existing punitive damages
procedures to the demands of fundamental fairness in mass tort situations
have been unsatisfactory.
The court rejected the argument that providing an impartial judicial
proceeding was in itself enough to guarantee the defendant's due process
interests. The court determined that simply guaranteeing the defendant his
day in court was insufficient if the standards and procedures employed in
the litigation were no longer sufficient to protect the defendant's interest in
a fundamentally fair proceeding. 99 The Juzwin I court held that the fun-
damental fairness demands of the due process clause dictated that a party
could not be subject to repetitive awards of punitive damages arising out of
a single course of conduct absent a class action or appropriate legislation.
The court granted the motion to dismiss all punitive claims against each
defendant if that party had already been subject to an exemplary award in
previous litigation related to the production and distribution of asbestos
products .200
B. Juzwin I
Following the Juzwin I decision, the defendants would have been able to
escape punitive liability by producing evidence of a verdict providing an
exacted in previous actions. However, such recourse provides little more than a self-defeating
option to a defendant attempting to successfully defend his case with respect to compensatory
liability. Id. The court also found the vagueness in the standards of review and limitations on
the use of class actions for products liability claims rendered those alternatives for controlling
punitive awards inadequate. Id. at 1056-57 n.l.
196. Id. at 1061 (quoting Brennan, Reason, Passion and "The Progress of the Law", 10
CARDOZO L. REv. 3, 15-16 (1988)).
197. See id. at 1062-63 (discussing recent mass tort cases in which the courts questioned the
acceptability of current procedures in light of fundamental fairness requirements).
198. Id. at 1063. In the context of asbestos litigation, proponents of class actions face
difficulties related to proving limited funds, satisfying commonality requirements and establish-
ing a class that would not be fatally underinclusive, which render the procedure ineffective and
thus improper. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text (referring to the two circuit court
decisions which decertified class actions seeking punitive damages).
199. Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1061 ("Officials cannot always silence these questions solely
by pointing to rational action taken according to standard rules." (quoting Brennan, supra
note 196, at 15-16)).
200. Id. at 1065.
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exemplary award from any previous lawsuit arising from the conduct which
prompted the Juzwin claim.20' Upon motion by the plaintiff, the court
reconsidered this ruling and reinstated the claims for punitive damages.
20 2
The court maintained that the due process analysis set out in Juzwin I-that
multiple awards of punitive damages violate the fundamental fairness re-
quirement of the due process clause-was correct. Nevertheless, two consid-
erations militated against barring the exemplary claims: first, it was not clear
that any prior exemplary awards were intended to address the entire scope
of the defendant's conduct 20 ; and, second, limitations on authority prevented
the court from adequately enforcing its bar on subsequent punitive awards
in proceedings held outside the jurisdiction. 204
The Juzwin II court went on to explain that the trier of fact in any one
mass tort case may award punitive damages that are intended to address
either the entirety of the defendant's offensive conduct or only that portion
of the tortious act that caused the injury to the particular plaintiff then
before the court. Unless an award from a previous case was clearly intended
to address the entire scope of the defendant's conduct, including all past,
present and future claimants, a subsequent award of punitive damages in a
later trial based on the same tortious course of action would not necessarily
violate the fundamental fairness requirement of the due process clause.2 5 In
order to determine whether an exemplary award granted in any previous
litigation was intended to be conclusive as to the entire course of the
defendant's conduct, the court established four criteria:
1. A full and complete hearing must be held, after adequate time has
elapsed to investigate and discover the full scope and consequences of such
conduct and during which all relevant evidence is presented regarding the
conduct of the defendant against whom the claim is made;
2. Adequate representation is afforded to the plaintiff, with an oppor-
tunity for plaintiffs similarly situated and their counsel to cooperate and
contribute towards the presentation of the punitive damages claim, in-
cluding presentation of the past and probable future consequences of the
defendant's wrongful conduct;
3. An appropriate instruction to the jury that their award will be the one
and only award of punitive damages to be rendered against the company
for its wrongful conduct;
4. Such other conditions as Will assure a full, fair and complete presen-
tation of all the relevant evidence in support of and in opposition to the
claim.2-
In the Juzwin case, the defendants could not establish that these criteria
were satisfied in any previous trial so there was no guarantee that any
201. Id.
202. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989).
203. See id. at 1235 (admitting that it is unclear whether procedural safeguards were satisfied
in Juzwin 1).
204. Id. at 1236.
205. Id. at 1235.
206. Id. at 1234.
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previous punitive awards were not intended to address the entire course of
the defendants' conduct rather than that portion related to an individual
plaintiff.20 7
Furthermore, even if these criteria had been satisfied, the court went on
to state that current jurisdictional restrictions emasculate its ability to effec-
tively enforce any order barring subsequent punitive claims.20 The reasoning
behind the dismissal of punitive claims in Juzwin I reflected a desire to spare
the defendants from a procedure for assessing damages which the court
found to be fundamentally unfair; that is, to safeguard the due process
rights of the defendant. 2 09 Yet the court lacked any authority to prohibit
punitive awards in other courts. 210 Therefore, even had the court upheld its
decision to ban punitive claims, the defendants' due process rights would
not necessarily be vindicated. Limitations on the court's authority prohibited
it from fashioning an effective remedy. 21' Therefore, the Juzwin 11 court
reversed its prior ruling and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss all
punitive damage claims. 21 2
III. ANALYSIS
The double jeopardy and excessive fines clauses, in light of their histories
and interpretations, are not proper bases on which to rest a successful
constitutional challenge against claims for punitive damages in mass tort
litigation. The language and case law of these provisions indicates that their
proper scope is limited to cases involving interested governmental action and
the resulting difficulties the defendant must face in such cases.2 13 While
Juzwin I effectively evaded determining just what role the excessive fines
clause plays in private litigation, its disposition of the argument on grounds
of prematurity was adequate, particularly in light of the due process analysis
on which the court ultimately rested its decision. Had the Browning-Ferris
Industries decision been rendered prior to Juzwin I, the issue would have
been foreclosed as that decision clearly stated that the excessive fines clause
was not "intended to apply to damages awarded in disputes between private
parties. '2 t 4 Although Juzwin I did not resolve the scope of the excessive
fines clause in relation to private litigation, its disposition of the defendant's
eighth amendment challenge was consistent with the Browning-Ferris Indus-
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
210. Juzwin, 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
211. Id. ("Until there is uniformity, either through a Supreme Court decision, or national
legislation, this court is powerless to fashion a remedy which will protect the due process rights
of this defendant or other defendants similarly situated.").
212. Id. at 1236.
213. See supra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
214. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2916 (1989).
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tries holding. 2 5 The Juzwin court's rejection of the eighth amendment chal-
lenge was thus proper.
The double jeopardy and excessive fines discussions are not what makes
the Juzwin case notable. Rather the key to this decision is obviously the due
process analysis. Prior to Juzwin, only one federal court of appeals had
directly addressed the question of whether a defendant was deprived of due
process by multiple civil punishment for a single course of conduct, and that
court found that current procedures which allow for repeated punitive awards
satisfied constitutional requirements. 21 6 The approach adopted in Juzwin I
was thus in opposition to the only federal appellate level case which has
directly decided this important issue.2 17 The due process analysis used in
Juzwin is preferable to the narrow reading of due process requirements
adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Cathey.
Under the Cathey approach, a court need go no further than to provide
access to its halls in order to satisfy a party's right to due process. In light
of the circumstances, this minimal provision is insufficient. 21 The procedures
for assessing punitive damages are a product of state law developed generally
in the context of one-on-one tort litigation. 21 9 The current development of
mass tort litigation with its peculiar problems and demands have effectively
changed the manner in which the game is played; the fact that some form
of process is provided does not necessarily mean that is the process due. As
the court noted:
Due process asks whether government has treated someone fairly....
Officials cannot always silence these questions solely by pointing to rational
action taken according to standard rules .... [Tihe due process clause
demands of judges more than proficiency in logical analysis. It requires
that [they] be sensitive to the balance of reason and passion that mark a
given age, and the ways in which that balance leaves its mark on the
everyday exchanges between government and citizen. 21
Due process doctrines must be considered in relation to both the geographical
and commercial contexts in which they are applied. 221 The scope of mass
215. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
216. See Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir. 1985).
217. Compare Juzwin 1, 705 F. Supp. at 1061 (holding that multiple awards of punitive
damages for a single course of conduct absolutely violate the fundamental fairness requirement
of the due process clause) with Cathey, 776 F.2d at 1571 (holding that there is no violation of
the defendant's procedural due process rights as long as he is afforded the opportunity to
litigate the propriety of a punitive damages award before the court).
218. See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir.) (because mass tort
litigation is highly prevalent, a defendant is constantly exposed to repetitious punishment for
the same culpable conduct), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986); Jeffries, supra note 2, at 139-
40 (criticizing current constitutional protections afforded punitive damages defendants).
219. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text; Comment, Mass Liability and Punitive
Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 1797, 1798 (1979).
220. Juzwin , 705 F. Supp. at 1061 (quoting Brennan, supra note 196, at 16).
221. Parcel Tankers, Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1459, 1459 (S.D. Tex.
1983).
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tort litigation is radically different from that of one-on-one litigation which
fostered the development of current punitive procedures. 22 As presently
applied, procedures used to determine a claim for punitive damages call for
juries to apply vague standards when deciding the proper amount of damages
necessary to punish and deter a particular defendant. 223 These imprecise
measures are than exacerbated as each individual jury in the overall course
of cases comes to an independent decision as to what punitive damages, if
any, will be awarded based on the relatively narrow facts presented to it. In
addition, the jury may be unable to take into consideration any awards that
may have been exacted in previous cases or may be granted in cases yet to
be tried. Therefore, to simply accept these procedures as adequate without
examining the demands of this new setting is insufficient to meet the con-
stitutional demands of due process. 224 Rather, it is a neglect of judicial
duty. 225
A. Punitive Damages and the Mathews Test of Fundamental Fairness
While the approach used in Cathey may be constitutionally insufficient,
it does not necessarily follow that the Juzwin II due process analysis is
proper. In order to properly assess the Juzwin II court's holding, one must
examine current punitive damages procedures in light of the due process
criteria set out by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.2 2 6 Those
factors which must be assessed are: (1) the defendant's private interest; (2)
the risk of erroneous results and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedures; and, (3) the government interest in protecting the functions
involved in light of any additional burdens alternate procedures may de-
mand .227
1. The Defendant's Private Interest
In instances of mass tort litigation, the private interest at stake with respect
to punitive damages involves, at a minimum, the total fiscal liability the
defendant will incur throughout the course of litigation arising from the
tortious conduct. When examined in light of the potential severity of punitive
awards, this interest, in the overall course of the litigation, can amount to
a threat against the continued viability of the defendant corporation. In a
222. Mass tort litigation is unique in that it takes the question of a party's liability for a
given act and splits it among a variety of independent jurisdictions for determination.
223. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
224. Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981) (the fourteenth
amendment imposes on a state the standards necessary to ensure judicial proceedings are
fundamentally fair); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1436 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (in order
to insure due process, the court must find that the judicial system under which judgment was
rendered was essentially fair).
225. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
226. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
227. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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very real sense, the ultimate interest at stake is thus the continued existence
of the enterprise. 228 While the question of whether civil litigation can properly
offer a remedy which results in the bankruptcy of a defendant is not at issue
here, it seems only reasonable that any sanction with such awesome potential,
should only be available through procedures which clearly allow for the
thorough consideration of all relevant factors.
229
2. Risk of Erroneous Results and Substitute Procedures
The current case-by-case method for assessing punitive damages presents
an unacceptable threat of erroneous deprivation of the defendant's interest
in the mass tort context. In an individual case, the question of whether a
punitive award should be made and, if so, for what amount, is normally
left to the ultimate discretion of the jury. 2a0 Because punitive damages
ultimately serve the public interests of retribution and deterrence, 23  it is
proper to leave this function to the jury, which by definition represents the
public. 23 2 In each individual case, the jury is allowed to assess punitive
damages, yet receives little guidance as to just how to determine the proper
size of such an award.233 The trial and appellate courts then have the
opportunity to either reduce or eliminate the award granted by the jury, yet
the vagueness surrounding the standards of review severely limits any control
the court may have over a jury award.2 14 While these shortcomings alone
may not be sufficient to deprive a defendant of due process, they are
effectively multiplied across the course of the entire litigation and are aug-
mented by the difficulties of inter-jurisdictional control characteristic of a
mass tort case.235
The jury will often be uninformed as to the punitive damages already
awarded and thus incapable of granting the defendant an offset for that
amount unless the defendant chooses the self-destructive option of informing
228. See Seltzer, supra note 42, at 51 (noting that although single awards appear reasonable,
when aggregated, they can threaten the very survival of a business entity).
229. Juzwin 1, 705 F. Supp. at 1055-56 (the court stated that even if we allow the jury the
power to punish a company by awarding punitive damages, it should award these damages
intentionally, and not inadvertently by unknowingly combining its award with others in the
past and future).
230. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Central Beverage Co., 172 Ind. App. 81, 111, 359 N.E.2d
566, 581 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).
231. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
232. See COMM. ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., THE JURY SYSTEM IN FEDERAL COURTS 5 (1973) ("[Tlhe jury is the democratic way of
involving the public in the judicial process.")."
233. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text; Mallor and Roberts, supra note 15, at
663 (the lack of standards for punitive damages may cause the judge to hesitate to disturb the
jury's award, reasoning that her judgment can be little better than the jury's).
235. See supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
1990l
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
the jury himself.23 6 Further, the jury will be incapable of predicting the
exemplary damages any future juries might exact. Finally, self-interest and
an inability to establish effective punitive limits for the entire course of
litigation provide individual jurisdictions with no incentive to halt these
damages should they reach the level of overkill. 2 7 These difficulties, partic-
ularly in light of the lack of guidance which plagues individual exemplary
awards, 238 increase the possibility that an erroneous deprivation of the de-
fendant's property will occur, since any punitive award that goes beyond the
amount needed to deter or punish the defendant is excessive and therefore
unjustified.
That an erroneous deprivation of the defendant's interests may result is
not in itself enough to satisfy the second step of the Mathews test; one must
also determine whether any alteration of current procedures would improve
on the results of the current system. A variety of proposals for addressing
the difficulties of punitive damages in mass tort litigation have been sug-
gested. 239 The strengths and weaknesses of a number of the reform proposals
will be addressed below. For the current analysis, it is sufficient to conclude
that alternate procedures are available which would decrease the possibility
of the defendant suffering an erroneous deprivation of its interests in the
overall litigation.
3. Governmental Interests
The final Mathews factor requires consideration of the government inter-
ests involved and the burdens of instituting any change. The state does have
some limited interests in imposing punitive damages in mass tort cases. These
include encouraging the enforcement of legal norms, 240 discouraging manu-
facturers and other business enterprises from abusing the trust of the mar-
ketplace,2 4' and venting public outrage over egregious conduct. 242 It is proper
for the state to attempt to achieve these goals but they are served only if
the amount of damages awarded is closely tailored to that amount needed
to effectuate the state's aims. For example, the state has no interest in a
system which imposes damages which are excessive in relation to the need
236. As the Juzwin I court observed, "[t]o require a defendant to present such prejudicial
information to a jury as its only alternative is to place it between Scylla and Charybdis." 705
F. Supp. at 1056. See also Seltzer, supra note 42, at 59-60 (knowledge of previous punitive
awards may bias the jury against the defendant who therefore often would prefer to take his
chances with an uninformed jury).
237. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
239. See infra notes 257-74 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
241. Juzwin 1, 705 F. Supp. at 1064 (potential and actual punitive damage awards do serve
an important function in establishing standards of conduct and insuring a means to punish and
deter those who deviate from those standards).
242. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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for deterrence.2 43 While the state does have an interest in imposing punitive
damages, the interest is thus limited in that an exemplary award should not
be unrelated to the amount needed to achieve the policy considerations
supporting such damages. 2" Government interests are therefore not sufficient
to outweigh any need for reform in the current system. In many respects,
reform would only enhance the protection of government interests because
it may serve to alleviate the current risks of overdeterrence and underterr-
ence.
245
. Given the foregoing analysis, it is evident the current case-by-case approach
for awarding punitive damages does not satisfy the Mathews test for fun-
damental fairness in the mass tort context. The Juzwin I decision, which
stated that multiple punitive awards assessed through individual and inde-
pendent juries are unconstitutional, 246 thus was important because it recog-
nized that the current economic scope of mass tort litigation has outstripped
the traditional one-on-one setting in which punitive damages are assessed.
The Juzwin II decision to reinstate the claims for punitive damages therefore
seems unsatisfactory; it makes little sense to allow a remedy to be assessed
through procedures that are deemed unconstitutional. Yet the court's decision
to allow the plaintiff's punitive damages claims is defensible in at least two
respects.
First, it is important to keep in mind the procedural status of this case
which involved a pretrial motion for the dismissal of claims. Because the
district court was dealing with an unsettled area of the law, the constitu-
tionality of punitive procedures in mass tort litigation, it was likely the
decision would be reviewed on appeal. By upholding the litigation of the
claims, the court allowed the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury.
The jury would thus be left with the decision of whether to grant an
exemplary award (assuming the facts warranted submission of the claim to
the jury). If the jury returned no such award, the point would be moot. If
the jury granted punitive damages, the trial court would then be free to
vacate this award. Should the lower court refuse to vacate the award and
the defendants appeal, the court of appeals could reverse the Juzwin I
decision, accept the more narrow due process approach adopted by the
Cathey court, and find the procedures for punitive damages constitutional.
Should this happen, the record on appeal would already contain a jury
243. Wheeler, supra note 40, at 306.
244. Id. The goal of deterrence, as well as other government interests, is usually not considered
important enough to find that the state has a substantial interest in imposing punitive damages.
Id. at 304.
245. Id. at 306-09. Overdeterrence is possible because a jury can decide the amount of
punitive damages without being subject to meaningful review, and is subject to emotion and
prejudice. Id. at 307. Underdeterrence occurs when individuals assume they will be the bene-
ficiaries of jury bias, and therefore would not be subject to punitive damage awards. Id. at
308.
246. Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1061.
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verdict as to the punitive award and there would be no need for a remand.
The court's somewhat confusing position on rehearing thus provides a means
of avoiding a retrial on the issue of punitive damages and gives a reviewing
court a basis for vacating any exemplary award that may be entered, thereby
conserving judicial resources.
Second, the court held that the procedures for awarding punitive damages
were unconstitutional, not necessarily the punitive damages themselves." 7
Punitive damages are indeed proper should procedures provide for one
authoritative determination regarding the defendant's punitive liability. 248 In
Juzwin, however, there was no evidence such an authoritative remedy had
already been provided since there was no showing a previous jury award
had satisfied the criteria set out in Juzwin II.
Furthermore, the unconstitutional aspects of punitive damages procedures
are a product of the national scope of mass tort litigation. While current
procedures are constitutionally defective and reform is possible, jurisdictional
shortcomings cripple the lower court's ability to fashion an effective remedy.
The Juzwin court thus faced the dilemma of denying the punitive damages
and thereby sacrificing the interests of the plaintiff and government in seeing
such sanctions enforced or allowing the claims and perpetuating the defi-
ciencies of the current system. Even if the court were to deny the defendant's
claims, the constitutional defects in the procedures would not be cured as
other jurisdictions would not be obligated to follow the decision. Because
the defect in the litigation process is at the national level and the district
court can only operate on the local level, the course taken on rehearing
represents the lesser of two evils.
While the resolution of the issue of punitive damages in Juzwin H was
rational, it is not satisfying. The district court's hands are effectively tied:
it declares a procedure to be constitutionally insufficient yet is impotent to
establish a system which better serves justice in this case. It can only provide
justice on the local level and therefore the defendant's right to due process
is sacrificed. Jurisdictional considerations frustrate attempts to certify class
actions2 49 and prohibit the court from conclusively enforcing any punitive
award it renders. 2 0 The Juzwin H criteria for ensuring a conclusive award
of punitive damages 25' cannot be met under present procedures. Therefore,
the Juzwin decision highlights the need for procedural reform which has
been advocated for a number of years. 25 2
247. Id. at 1064-65.
248. Id. at 1065.
249. See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d at 1002 (difficulty of obtaining class
certification in diversity jurisdiction asbestos action); but see Seltzer, supra note 42, at 61 (the
circumstances in some mass tort cases may lend themselves to resolution of punitive damages
issues by a class action).
250. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1967) (difficulty
enforcing punitive damages awards of hundreds of plaintiffs in many jurisdictions).
251. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Flaherty, Mass Torts (The Year in the Law), NAT'L L.J., Dec. 31, 1984, p.
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IV. IMPACT
Punitive damage procedures have recently received significant legislative
attention at the state level.253 However, these revisions have not successfully
addressed the concerns highlighted in the criteria set out by the Juzwin court.
Furthermore, reforms on the state level will be necessarily insufficient in
alleviating the current problems due to the jurisdictional restrictions high-
lighted in the Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell and Juzwin II decisions.
National reforms which would require action at the federal level are neces-
sary.25 4 This would call for either a Supreme Court decision or congressional
legislation that addresses the issue. 2-5 Since the Supreme Court is not sched-
uled to address this specific issue in the near future, congressional action
would provide a more direct and immediate cure. Furthermore, under the
aegis of the commerce clause, Congress is vested with the broad authority
necessary to effectively address this problem.2 6
A. Suggested Reforms
Commentators have suggested a variety of adjustments for the methods
of awarding punitive damages in mass tort litigation. One such proposal
calls for the complete abolition of punitive damages in the mass tort con-
16, col. 2 (discussing settlement of several mass tort cases associated with difficulties present
in mass tort trials).
253. See generally Ghiardi, supra note 5, at 195. Professor Ghiardi surveys legislative
alterations in punitive damages procedures including: (1) changes in the burden of proof, see,
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5 (West 1987) (in products liability action, plaintiff may receive
punitive damages if he can show by preponderance of evidence that defendant acted with actual
malice or wanton disregard of safety); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80 (Anderson Supp. 1988)
(plaintiff in products liability claim must show right to punitive award by clear and convincing
evidence); (2) changes in pleading requirements, see, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-
604.1 (1987) (in certain actions, initial pleadings may not contain a prayer for punitive damages;
they may be requested by motion after a hearing); (3) changes in proving the defendant's
wealth, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West Supp. 1989) (discovery regarding wealth of
defendant available only after plaintiff establishes a reasonable basis for punitive damages); (4)
abolishment of exemplary awards, see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 18.550 (1987) (punitive damages
not available in medical malpractice actions where defendant is licensed, registered or certified);
(5) limitations on the amount recoverable, see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1989) (punitive
damages cannot exceed $250,000 unless there is intentionally wrongful conduct, malice, or
defamation); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987) (punitive damages cannot exceed the amount
of compensatory damages); (6) bifurcation of trials, see, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3295 (West
Supp. 1990); and, (7) changes in the conduct requirement, see, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
411.184 (Baldwin Supp. 1988) (defendant's conduct must reflect oppression, fraud or malice).
See also 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at § 18.1 (providing citations and
annotations of significant legislative developments for the various jurisdictions punitive damages
procedures).
254. Jeffries, supra note 2, at 147.
255. Juzwin II, 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
256. See Wickard v. Filburn 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942). The Court explained that power under
the commerce clause is not limited to congressional regulation of commerce between states. It
extends to any activities which effect interstate commerce. Id.
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text. 257 Claiming current procedures are inherently ineffective and incapable
of meaningful reform, 25 s adherents of this view turn to the functions served
by punitive damages. Focusing on the goal of deterrence, they claim punitive
damages are unnecessary as the enormous level of compensatory liability
facing defendants is itself sufficient to dissuade participation in conduct
which may lead to mass tort liability. 25 9 In the mass tort context, compen-
satory claims will often exceed any coverage provided by a corporate insur-
ance policy and thus insurance would not undermine the deterrent effect of
compensatory damages in this situation. Furthermore, even if defendants
were able to insure for the full extent of their compensatory liability,
increased costs of attaining this insurance coupled with the unrecoverable
costs of litigation and disruption to the corporate enterprise would deter a
party from breaching its duty of care. 260
While the case for abolishing punitive damages in the mass tort context
is impressive, it is fatally flawed in that it fails to recognize that an award
of punitive damages can serve interests other than deterrence and retribution.
While these goals provide the primary justification for an exemplary award, 261
they are not the exclusive rationales supporting the remedy. Important
intangible concerns such as expressing the outrage of the community and
more practical concerns such as sidestepping the American rule regarding
litigation expenses-and thus ensuring that an innocent party is not left
inadequately compensated after the traditional contingency fee has been
extracted from the compensatory award-are also served by punitive damages
-awards.262 It also seems anomalous that a party could avoid punitive liability
by continuing its misconduct until a large number of people are injured
rather than just a few. 263 The elimination of punitive damages from mass
tort litigation therefore is not necessary to assure fundamental fairness in
such cases.
A second suggestion calls for a single exemplary award to be issued in the
initial case, thereby settling the issue of punitive liability for the entire course
257. Szuch & Shelley, supra note 3, at 13, col. 1.
258. Id. at 13, col. 2.
Not only are the number of potential claimants and the extent of potential injury
unknown, the standard of liability to which a manufacturer may be held varies
widely from state to state. Moreover, standards of liability continue to undergo





261. For the goals of, and theories behind, punitive damages, see supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 16-32 and accompanying text (discussing reasons advanced for punitive
damage awards).
263. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658, 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (lst Dist.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 98 II1. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983).
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of the litigation.216 This claim would be conclusive as to the issue of punitive
damages. Such an approach has been generally discredited, however, as it
would award exemplary damages only to the first plaintiff to attain a verdict
on her claim.26' This proposal would also present the culpable defendant
with an incentive to forum shop for a sympathetic court in the hopes of
maneuvering a small award which will serve to preclude later verdicts. 266 In
addition, a system that allows one party to recover a substantial windfall
while others similarly situated receive no share of that award would suffer
from arbitrariness. Furthermore, the availability of a single exemplary award
would place plaintiff's lawyers, many of whom may represent more than
one claimant, in a possible conflict of interests when determining which case
to try first and what resources to commit to a given case.
267
An innovative twist given this approach is to adopt an additive method
for providing punitive damages claims. 261 In the initial case, the issues would
be tried and the jury would award punitive damages if proper. In subsequent
cases, during the trial, no evidence would be admitted as to the previous
award and a verdict granting exemplary damages could again be returned
and adjusted if necessary. Only then would evidence regarding prior punitive
damages awards be admitted. If the award set in the present case were
greater than the largest prior award, the plaintiff would be granted the
difference between the previous and present awards. Thus, the defendant
receives an offset for those punitive damages claims it has already satisfied.2 69
This proposal, however, runs into the same shortfalls as does limiting punitive
damages to only the first plaintiff. First, there is an arbitrary windfall
conferred on the first plaintiff.270 Second, lawyers representing more than
one plaintiff, suffer a conflict of interests.
264. The Senate Committee of Commerce, Science, & Transportation proposed a limit of
one punitive damage award per defendant's action in 1984, as part of the proposed Product
Liability Act. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984). Although the committee report
indicated this limitation, the bill itself did not contain similar language. S. 44., 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 13 (1984).
A similar approach is to establish a cap on punitive damages for the entire course of litigation.
This limit could be in the form of a preset dollar limit or a multiple of the compensatory
damages. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1989) (punitive damages shall not exceed
$350,000) with CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987) (punitive damages cannot exceed the
amount of actual damages). Such limitations are subject to criticism on the grounds that preset
caps frustrate the achievement of deterrence and punishment because not all defendants are
alike. See Ghiardi, supra note 5, at 196. Furthermore, these limits may be quickly exhausted,
thus depriving later claimants any opportunity to share in the awards. Seltzer, supra note 42,
at 56.
265. Id.
266. A.B.A., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 135, at 73.
267. Seltzer, supra note 42, at 56.
268. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 219, at 1800-01.
269. Id.
270. But see id. at 1811-12 (providing initial plaintiffs with larger punitive awards is justified
because they often will carry added expenses of proving issues for first time, thereby establishing
precedents which later plaintiffs can exploit in order to reduce their own litigation costs).
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The problems of punitive damages procedures in the mass tort context are
a product of the decentralization which results from determining the question
of punitive liability in each individual case in the overall course of trials.
Those difficulties can only be avoided if a system is created which provides
sufficient control over the determination of punitive liability for the entire
course of conduct. Such control would be best established if a single court
is granted exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of punitive liability. 27' This
would provide a means of protecting both the interests of the plaintiff and
the general public in having punitive damages imposed as well as the defen-
dant's due process right to a fundamentally fair procedure for determining
its sanction. Recent proposals have addressed these concerns and suggested
implementing a judicial panel which would be empowered to order the
consolidation of punitive damages claims in mass tort litigation.2 72 The
adoption of such a procedure could provide a court with the authority to
efficiently control the resolution of punitive claims. In addition, the court
would be able to issue a verdict that, under the considerations set out in
Juzwin II, would consider and account for the entirety of the defendant's
conduct.
273
B. Formation of a Judicial Panel to Oversee
National Punitive Damages Cases
A report from the American Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts
calls for federal legislation which would establish a judicial panel to oversee
litigation in mass tort cases.274 Under the proposed system, the panel would
be authorized to appoint a single court in which to determine the punitive
damages question and, in suitable cases, the court would also determine
issues such as causation or liability which may be common to all suits. The
question of compensatory damages would, however, be left to the authority
of individual courts trying the various claims arising out of the defendant's
conduct. 271 Current procedures would allow for the formation of a judicial
body which could coordinate the determination of punitive damages in mass
tort claims, however, legislative action is required to trigger the process.
Federal rules currently allow a trial court to sever certain issues for
independent determination 276 In addition, federal law authorizes a judicial
panel established by the Chief Justice of the United States to consolidate
claims pending in various districts that present common questions of law for
271. See A.B.A., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 135, at 78 (proposing a federal judge control
adjudication of punitive damage claims).
272. Id. A.B.A. Urges Mass-Tort Panel, Chicago Daily L. Bull., July 17, 1989, at 1, col. 2
(hereinafter, Mass-Tort Panel].
273. See supra notes 205-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Juzwin H due process
considerations).
274. Mass-Tort Panel, supra note 272, at 1.
275. Id.
276. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
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pretrial proceedings.2 77 Section 1407 of title 28, which deals with multi-
district litigation, has been used to authorize retention of the consolidated
issues for trial and under current procedures, it is possible to conduct an
independent trial on the common issue of punitive damages.2 78 Yet a number
of issues currently stand in the way of allowing for such a trial in a mass
tort situation.
First, a judicial panel with the authority to consolidate the punitive issues
must be convened under section 1407 and a triggering device which alerts
the panel as to when a given series of cases are sufficient to threaten the
concerns of due process must be established. 279 A jurisdictional requirement
of 100 cases that each seek a minimum of $50,000 in damages has been
suggested.2 80 A definite jurisdictional requirement, however, is arbitrary and
not likely to protect the interests of a smaller business enterprise which finds
itself subject to a series of suits that, while not numbering high enough to
reach the jurisdictional trigger, are sufficient to present a true danger of
overkill given the defendant's more modest resources. An individualized
threshold would therefore be preferable. The American Bar Association,
Special Section on Litigation suggests that mass punitive damages trials be
invoked upon "a finding by the judge that there is a reasonable possibility
that adequate compensatory damages will not be available if punitive dam-
ages are not brought under control. ' 28 1 This flexible formula calls for the
panel to consider the characteristics of each series of cases and make a
reasonable determination as to the likelihood that the aggregate liability of
the defendant will exceed that party's resources and thus threaten the defen-
dant's due process interests as well as the compensatory interests of later
plaintiffs.2 82 This specialized consideration would provide a superior method
for protecting the interests of all involved because an arbitrary cut-off may
restrict otherwise qualified cases from receiving the protections of judicial
overview while qualifying some cases in spite of the fact the defendant is
sufficiently endowed to withstand the number of claims filed against it.
Legislation should also provide federal judges with control over the actions
pending in state courts.2 3 Unless a court is given control over the entirety
of the proceedings in a case, its ability to truly serve its function is likely to
be ineffective. An exception to the Anti-Injunction Act which currently
frustrates the use of class actions therefore should be established.2 4 The
277. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
278. A.B.A., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 135, at 76.
279. In other words, a properly authorized panel must be convened and given sufficient
criteria by which they can establish that a series of mass tort claims may threaten the defendant's
viability. Mass-Tort Panel, supra note 272, at 1.
280. Id.
281. A.B.A., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 135, at 79 (emphasis in original).
282. Id. at 79-80.
283. Id. at 79.
284. Id. If plaintiffs were allowed to freely file suits in state courts after there had been a
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controlling court must also determine what standard of proof should be met
on the issue of punitive liability. In order to ensure that all state levels are
satisfied, an elevated burden should be imposed. Suggestions include that
during the trial on punitive damages, plaintiff must show the defendant's
conduct "showed substantially greater indifference to safety than ordinary
negligence and was established under a 'clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard.' "285 Commentators contend this heightened standard would be proper,
since the consequences of a punitive damages award are more serious than
that of other civil awards. 28 6 In order to exercise complete control over the
issue of punitive damages, the ruling in the consolidated trial must be
conclusive for all such claims, including those not yet filed. 28 7 The timing of
the mass trial in this respect is very important. Should the proceeding be
held too soon in the development of the litigation, it may be difficult to
accurately predict the true extent of the defendant's conduct. If the pro-
ceeding were delayed, the earlier plaintiffs will have their right to compen-
sation on their punitive charges needlessly postponed. The panel must therefore
be sensitive not only to the threshold requirements of a sufficiently threat-
ening number of claims but also to the timing of its consolidation of those
suits. 288 Upon resolution of the consolidated trial, distribution of the award
must be managed. Immediate distribution to plaintiffs who have already
established their right to a portion of the award should occur once the
judgment is final, and trust funds can be established to protect the interests
of future recipients.
28 9
The implementation of a consolidated trial for all punitive damages claims
in mass tort cases would help ensure that an award of punitive damages
determination by the judicial panel which commits the punitive claims to a certain federal
venue, the authority of the panel and the federal court would be easily evaded. Therefore, a
limitation on the availability of state court proceedings must be established which would require
an exception to the Anti-Injunction statute. Cf. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175,
1183 (8th Cir.) (class action could not be maintained in personal injury suits arising out of
walkway collapse because such a class would interfere with state court proceedings and thus
violate the Ant-injunction act), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
285. Mass-Tort Panel, supra note 272, at 1, col. 4-5.
286. Comment, supra note 66, at 417-18. Although the author notes some similarities between
criminal sanctions and punitive damages, the conclusion reached is that the latter does not
require the same measure of procedural safeguards. Id.
287. A.B.A., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 135, at 81.
288. Id. at 80. The concerns reflected in the flexible formula for establishing jurisdiction
must be carefully monitored in order to determine when the action is ripe.
289. Id. at 81. This presents the problem of whether to provide for a per capita distribution
or a division proportionate to the plaintiffs' compensatory claims. Id. Because it would be
impossible to predict the percentage of overall damages which will be awarded to the plaintiffs
in future cases, any attempt to make a proportionate distribution of the punitive award would
be mere guesswork. While the damages that may be awarded to future plaintiffs would be
difficult to predict, reasonably accurate projections regarding the expected number of prospective
plaintiffs could be made. Thus, the per capita distribution is preferable. Id. As distribution to
future, undetermined plaintiffs, a trust fund may be established which would protect their
interests. Id.
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issued against a defendant in such litigation would be both comprehensive
in that it would address the entire scope of the defendant's conduct, and
efficient in that it would relieve the individual trial courts of the burden
involved in repeatedly resolving similar claims. Furthermore, a panel-initiated
consolidation process would achieve these aims in a manner that satisfies
the four criteria for a comprehensive punitive damages verdict set out in
Juzwin I.
The first consideration recognized by the Juzwin H court calls for a
complete hearing regarding the defendant's conduct to be held after adequate
time has elapsed to investigate and discover the full scope of the consequences
of that conduct.29° A judicial panel empowered to oversee and monitor the
development of all claims filed against a mass tort defendant would have
the flexibility needed to consider various aspects of the overall case and
consolidate those actions if it reasonably appears punitive awards could
threaten the availability of adequate compensatory damages. 29, Once this
determination is made, a single court would be vested with authority to hear
all punitive claims. The delay encountered during the decisional period while
the panel determines whether to consolidate the punitive claims coupled with
the appointed court's authority to freely entertain evidence regarding the
effect of the defendant's conduct on a wide range of parties would satisfy
the first criterion indicated in Juzwin II. Indeed, the scope and timing of
the consolidated trial would be certain to provide a more thorough and
comprehensive investigation of the defendant's conduct than can be achieved
in a series of individual one-on-one trials.
The second consideration calls for adequate representation of all plaintiffs
and suitable presentation of all past and future consequences of defendant's
conduct.2 92 The court hearing a consolidated trial could easily assure adequate
presentation of plaintiffs' interests by appointing a representative party to
assert the claims of all those filing for punitive damages. The fact that a
party would herself be interested in the outcome of the proceeding would
ensure adequate advocacy at the consolidated trial. Furthermore, a consol-
idated trial could provide for greater protection of the interests of plaintiffs
who have not yet filed claims against the defendant but would be likely to
do so in the future.2 93 By consolidating the overall process of litigation
against the defendant, the court would be able to gauge the total impact of
the defendant's conduct and thus draw reasonable predictions as to the
number of possible future claimants. The court could even appoint counsel
to represent the interests of those parties and may set aside funds from any
judgment against the defendant which could later be distributed to future
claimants .294
290. Juzwin H1, 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D.N.J. 1989).
291. See supra text accompanying note 281.
292. Juzwin I, 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
293. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
294. See A.B.A., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 135, at 75-77 (discussing centralized deter-
mination of punitive damages).
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The third criterion for a conclusive verdict recognized by the Juzwin II
court called for an instruction to the jury that their award would be the
only exemplary award rendered against the defendant.2 95 This requirement is
designed to bring to the attention of the trier of fact the intended impact of
the verdict and the finality of their decision. In a case involving a consolidated
trial of all punitive damages claims, the fact that the award would be intended
to be the one and only punitive damages judgement rendered against the
defendant could easily be made clear to the trier of fact. Indeed, the very
fact that one consolidated proceeding was being held would only underscore
the finality of the verdict rendered.
The final consideration identified by the Juzwin II court calls for the
punitive award to be rendered under "such other conditions as will assure
a full, fair and complete presentation of all relevant evidence in support of
and in opposition to the claim. ' 2 96 By adopting a panel initiated consolidation
procedure, resolution of punitive claims in mass tort cases could be accom-
plished under conditions which would more effectively provide the funda-
mentally fair setting which the Juzwin court required. By adopting a flexible
approach for determining whether to hold a consolidated trial, the panel
would be able to evaluate and consider the probable impact of claims and
more accurately predict future consequences of the defendant's conduct. 297
Resolving the issue of punitive damages in a proceeding which considered
the entirety of the defendant's conduct rather than in the more limited setting
of one-on-one litigation would provide the trier of fact a more complete and
accurate record on which to base any punitive award it may feel is warranted.
In addition to providing a more complete record, a consolidated proceeding
would provide a sense of needed control to the resolution of these claims.
The problems of mass tort cases have created difficulties for both the
parties litigating the claims and the court systems attempting to facilitate
them. A change in the piecemeal fashion in which these claims are tried is
needed.298 Procedural tactics such as the consolidation of similar issues would
serve to lessen the strain these suits are creating, and the unification of
punitive damages claims is a step which courts should take. However,
limitations in the current procedure call for legislative action designed to
establish an institutional structure that would enable the court system to
gain some sort of control over these cases. The establishment of a judicial
panel empowered to oversee instances of mass litigation would help better
serve the needs of all parties involved.
V. CONCLUSION
The concept of punitive damages is an important element of the civil law
which provides a vital means of expressing societal disapproval towards
295. 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
296. Id.
297. A.B.A., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 135, at 75.
298. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (financial strain from litigating punitive
damage claims individually).
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egregious conduct. The development of punitive damages procedures was
grounded in one-on-one tort litigation and thus reflects the concerns evident
in these traditional disputes. However, recent developments have seen the
proliferation of mass tort litigation and the provincial limitations inherent
in punitive procedures make their application in these proceedings unsatis-
factory, in light of the constitutional guarantee of fundamental fairness in
all civil proceedings. In the mass tort context, the breadth of the defendants'
conduct has moved the litigation regarding punitive measures from a localized
setting of a traditional one-on-one tort claim to a national theater in which
the defendants' economic survival may hang in the balance. Current pro-
cedures do not and cannot accommodate this fundamental change. Under
the current systems, defendants are regularly subjected to repeated punitive
claims arising from a single course of conduct. Although restrictions on the
double jeopardy and excessive fines doctrines prevent the application of these
provisions to civil proceedings, these multiple punishments are, nonetheless,
unconstitutional because they violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The decision in Juzwin I clearly illustrated the shortcomings of the current
outdated mode of assessing punitive damages in mass tort cases. In contrast,
the Juzwin II decision illustrates the trial court's inability to remedy the
procedural and structural limitations inherent in the current case-by-case
litigation of these claims. As a result of the state based nature of punitive
claims, federal and state courts are powerless to individually remedy the
shortcomings in mass tort punitive damages procedures. Congress, therefore,
must step in to cure the ills of mass tort litigation.
Jim Fieweger
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